Babrak Karmal
Babrak Karmal | |
---|---|
بَبرَک کارمَل | |
General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan | |
In office 27 December 1979 – 4 May 1986 | |
Preceded by | Hafizullah Amin |
Succeeded by | Mohammad Najibullah |
Chairman of the Revolutionary Council | |
In office 27 December 1979 – 24 November 1986 | |
Preceded by | Hafizullah Amin |
Succeeded by | Haji Mohammad Chamkani |
Chairman of the Council of Ministers | |
In office 27 December 1979 – 11 June 1981 | |
Preceded by | Hafizullah Amin |
Succeeded by | Sultan Ali Keshtmand |
People's Representative for Kabul at the 12th Parliament of Afghanistan | |
In office 1964–1968 | |
Personal details | |
Born | Sultan Hussein 6 January 1929 Kamari, Royal Afghan Army |
Years of service | 1957–1959 |
Babrak Karmal (Dari/Pashto: ببرک کارمل; born Sultan Hussein; 6 January 1929 – 1 or 3 December 1996) was an Afghan communist revolutionary and politician who was the leader of Afghanistan, serving in the post of general secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1986.
Born in
Under Karmal's leadership, the Parchamite PDPA participated in
Karmal was promoted to Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and
Early life and career
Karmal was born Sultan Hussein
He attended
Communist politics
Imprisoned from 1953 to 1956, Karmal befriended fellow inmate
History of Afghanistan | |
---|---|
Timeline | |
410–557 | |
Nezak Huns | 484–711 |
During the 1965 parliamentary election Karmal was one of four PDPA members elected to the lower house of parliament; the three others were Anahita Ratebzad (whom he would later have an affair with according to Vasili Mitrokhin[16]), Nur Ahmed Nur and Fezanul Haq Fezan. No Khalqists were elected; however, Amin was 50 votes short of being elected. The Parchamite victory may be explained by the simple fact that Karmal could contribute financially to the PDPA electoral campaign.[17] Karmal became a leading figure within the student movement in the 1960s, electing Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal as Prime Minister after a student demonstration (called for by Karmal) concluded with three deaths under the former leadership.[18] In 1966 inside parliament, Karmal was physically assaulted by an Islamist MP, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.[19]
In 1967, the PDPA unofficially split into two formal parties, one Khalqist and one Parchamist. The dissolution of the PDPA was initiated by the closing down of the Khalqist newspaper,
The Daoud era
Shortly after the ban on opposition to the NRP, Daoud began a massive purge of Parchamites in government. Mohammad lost his position as interior minister, Abdul Qadir was demoted, and Karmal was put under government surveillance.[25] To mitigate Daoud's suddenly anti-communist directives, the Soviet Union reestablished the PDPA; Taraki was elected its General Secretary and Karmal, Second Secretary. While the Saur Revolution (literally the April Revolution) was planned for August, the assassination of Khyber led to a chain of events which ended with the communists seizing power.[26] Karmal, when taking power in 1979, accused Amin of ordering the assassination of Khyber.[26]
Taraki–Amin rule
Taraki was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the
On 27 June, three months after the
One of the dirty faces who for years under the false revolutionary mask and false slogans wanted to seduce the youth was Babrak Karmal, a product of tyrannical and despotic rule of
New Kabul Times, October 19, 1978, demonstrating the bitter break between the Khalq rulers and Karmal after the revolution[37]
Amin was informed of the Soviet decision to
That evening
Leadership
Domestic policies
Karmal's ascension was quickly troubled as he was effectively installed by the invading Soviet Union, delegitimizing him. Unrest in the country quickly escalated, and in Kabul two major uprisings, on 3 Hoot (22 February) and the months long students' protests were early signs of trouble. Karmal would also arrest Major Saddiq Alamyar in 1980, the commander of the 444th Commando Battalion, who committed the Kerala massacre while Afghanistan was still under the leadership of the Khalq. Other perpetrators were also arrested, such as other commandos and soldiers in the 11th Division of the Afghan Army. Alamyar remained in jail for a decade, even after Karmal was removed from his post as president.[42][43]
The "Fundamental Principles" and amnesty
When he came to power, Karmal promised an end to executions, the establishment of democratic institutions and free elections, the creation of a constitution, and legalization of alternative political parties. Prisoners incarcerated under the two previous governments would be freed in a general amnesty (which occurred on 6 January). He promised the creation of a coalition government which would not espouse socialism. At the same time, he told the Afghan people that he had negotiated with the Soviet Union to give economic, military and political assistance. The mistrust most Afghans felt towards the government was a problem for Karmal. Many still remembered he had said he would protect private capital in 1978—a promise later proven to be a lie.[44]
Karmal's three most important promises were the general amnesty of prisoners, the promulgation of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the adoption of a new flag containing the traditional black, red and green (the flag of Taraki and Amin was red). His government granted concessions to religious leaders and the restoration of confiscated property. Some property, which was confiscated during earlier land reforms, was also partially restored. All these measures, with the exception of the general amnesty of prisoners, were introduced gradually. Of 2,700 prisoners, 2,600 were released from prison; 600 of these were Parchamites. The general amnesty was greatly publicized by the government. While the event was hailed with enthusiasm by some, many others greeted the event with disdain, since their loved ones or associates had died during earlier purges. Amin had planned to introduce a general amnesty on 1 January 1980, to coincide with the PDPA's sixteenth anniversary.[45]
Work on the Fundamental Principles had started under Amin: it guaranteed democratic rights such as
The Fundamental Principles led to the establishment of two important state organs: the Special Revolutionary Court, a specialized court for crimes against national security and territorial integrity, and the Institute for Legal and Scientific Research and Legislative Affairs, the supreme legislative organ of state, This body could amend and draft laws, and introduce regulations and decrees on behalf of the government. The introduction of more Soviet-style institutions led the Afghan people to distrust the communist government even more.[47]
The Fundamental Principles constitution came into power on 22 April 1980.
Dividing power: Khalq–Parcham
With Karmal's ascension to power, Parchamites began to "settle old scores".
Over 14 and 15 March 1982 the PDPA held a party conference at the Kabul Polytechnic Institute instead of a party congress, since a party congress would have given the Khalq faction a majority and could have led to a Khalqist takeover of the PDPA. The rules of holding a party conference were different, and the Parchamites had a three-fifths majority. This infuriated several Khalqists; the threat of expulsion did not lessen their anger.[51] The conference was not successful, but it was portrayed as such by the official media. The conference broke up after one and a half days of a 3-day long program, because of the inter-party struggle for power between the Khalqists and the Parchamites. A "program of action" was introduced, and party rules were given minor changes. As an explanation of the low party membership, the official media also made it seem hard to become a member of the party.[52]
PDPA base
Karmal cabinet (1979–1981)[53] | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Office | Incumbent | Took office | Left office | |||||
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers | Assadullah Sarwari | 28 December 1979 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Planning | Sultan Ali Keshtmand | 28 December 1979 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of National Defence
|
Muhammad Rafie
|
28 December 1979 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Interior
|
Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy | 28 December 1979 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Foreign Affairs | Shah Muhammad Dost | 28 December 1979 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Education | Anahita Ratebzad | 28 December 1979 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Finance | Abdul Wakil
|
28 December 1979 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Transport | Sherjan Mazduryar | 28 December 1979 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Border and Tribes | Faiz Muhammad | 28 December 1979 | 14 September 1980 | |||||
Minister of Trade | Muhammad Khan Jalalar | 28 December 1979 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Communications
|
Muhammad Aslam Watanjar
|
10 January 1980 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Mines, Industries | Muhammad Isma'il Danesh | 10 January 1980 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Water, Power | Raz Muhammad Paktin | 10 January 1980 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Higher Education | Guldad | 10 January 1980 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Health | Nazar Muhammad
|
10 January 1980 | 11 June 1981 | |||||
Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform | Fazl Rahim Mohmand | 10 January 1980 | 11 June 1981 |
When Karmal took power, he began expanding the support base of the PDPA. Karmal tried to persuade certain groups, which had been referred to
By 1981, the government gave up on political solutions to the conflict. At the fifth PDPA Central Committee plenum in June, Karmal resigned from his Council of Ministers chairmanship and was replaced by
The national policy of reconciliation continued: in January 1984 the land reform introduced by Taraki and Amin was drastically modified, the limits of landholdings were increased to win the support of middle class peasants, the literacy programme was continued, and concessions to women were made. In 1985 the
Civil war and military
Soldiers | As of |
---|---|
25,000 | 1980[57] |
25–30,000 | 1981[58] |
25–30,000 | 1982[58] |
40,000 | 1983[59] |
40,000 | 1984[60] |
35–40,000 | 1985[61] |
In March 1979, the military budget was 6.4 million US$, which was 8.3 percent of the government budget, but only 2.2 of
When the political solution failed (
These measures were introduced due to the collapse of the army during the Soviet intervention. Before the intervention the army could field 100,000 troops, after the intervention only 25,000. Desertions were pandemic, and the recruitment campaigns for young people often drove them to the opposition.[63] To better organize the military, seven military zones were established, each with its own Defence Council. The Defence Councils were established at the national, provincial and district level to empower the local PDPA.[51] It is estimated that the Afghan government spent as much as 40 percent of government revenue on defense.[64]
Karmal refused to recognize the rebels as genuine, saying in an interview:
The people of Afghanistan do not recognise [the rebels] who include a number of hired people of the reactionary circles of Pakistan, Chinese chauvinists, imperialist America and Britain, and the reactionaries of Arab countries and the Zionists, who pretend to be the representatives of Afghanistan.[65]
Economy
Indicators | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1986 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Expenditure | Total (millions of afghanis) | 31,692 | 40,751 | 42,112 | 88,700 |
Ordinary (in percent) | 62 | 66 | 69 | 74 | |
Development (in percent) | 38 | 34 | 31 | 26 | |
Sources of Finances | Domestic revenue: excluding gas (in percent) | 50 | 40 | 37 | 31 |
Sales of natural gas (in percent) | 33 | 34 | 34 | 17 | |
Foreign aid (in percent) | 28 | 26 | 28 | 29 | |
Rentier income (in percent) | 61 | 59 | 62 | 48 | |
Domestic borrowing (in percent) | −11 | 1 | 0 | 23 |
During the civil war and the ensuing
Foreign policy
Karmal observed in early 1983 that without Soviet intervention, "It is unknown what the destiny of the Afghan Revolution would be ... We are realists and we clearly realize that in store for us yet lie trials and deprivations, losses and difficulties."[68] Two weeks before this statement Sultan Ali Keshtmand, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, lamented the fact that half the schools and three-quarters of communications had been destroyed since 1979.[68] The Soviet Union rejected several Western-made peace plans, such as the Carrington Plan, since they did not take into consideration the PDPA government. Most Western peace plans had been made in collaboration with the Afghan opposition forces. At the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated;[69]
We do not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed in conjunction with the question of security in the Persian Gulf. Naturally here on only the international aspects of the Afghan problem can be discussed, not internal Afghan affairs. The sovereignty of Afghanistan must be fully protected, as must its nonaligned status.
The stance of the Pakistani government was clear, demanding complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the establishment of a non-PDPA government. Karmal, summarizing his discussions with Iran and Pakistan, said "Iran and Pakistan have so far not opted for concrete and constructive positions."[70] During Karmal's rule Afghan–Pakistani relations remained hostile; the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the catalyst for the hostile relationship. The increasing numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan challenged the PDPA's legitimacy to rule.[71]
The Soviet Union threatened in 1985 that it would support the Baloch separatist movement in Pakistan if the Pakistani government continued to aid the Afghan mujahideen.[72] Karmal, problematically for the Soviets, did not want a Soviet withdrawal, and he hampered attempts to improve relations with Pakistan since the Pakistani government had refused to recognise the PDPA government.[73]
Public image
Because Karmal was put into power without a formal ceremony as in Afghan tradition, he was seen as an illegitimate leader in many eyes of his people. A poor performance in foreign interviews also did not help his public image where he was noted to speak like an "exhibitionist" rather than a statesman.[1] Karmal was widely viewed as a puppet leader of the Soviet Union by Afghans and the Western press.[74][75]
Despite his position, Karmal was apparently not permitted to make key decisions as he was following advice from Soviet advisers. The Soviet control of the Afghan state was apparently so much that Karmal himself admitted to a friend of his unfree life, telling him: “The Soviet comrades love me boundlessly, and for the sake of my personal safety, they don’t obey even my own orders.”[1]
The hands, feet and tongue of the poor Sultan had been tied, and he had no right to speak [without permission] with his personal friends.
— Zia Majid, a personal friend of Babrak Karmal[1]
Fall from power and succession
Najibullah was appointed to the PDPA Secretariat in November 1985. During Karmal's March 1986 visit to the Soviet Union, the Soviets tried to persuade Karmal that he was too ill to govern, and that he should resign.[80] This backfired, as a Soviet doctor attending to Karmal told him he was in good health. Karmal asked to return home to Kabul, and said that he understood and would listen to the Soviet recommendations. Before leaving, Karmal promised he would step down as PDPA General Secretary. The Soviets did not trust him and sent Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of intelligence (FCD) in the KGB, into Afghanistan. At a meeting in Kabul, Karmal confessed his undying love for the Soviet Union, comparing his ardor to his Muslim faith. Kryuchkov, concluding that he could not persuade Karmal to resign, left the meeting. After Kryuchkov left the room, the Afghan defence minister and the state security minister visited Karmal's office, telling him that he had to resign from one of his posts. Understanding that his Soviet support had been eliminated, Karmal resigned from the office of the General Secretary at the 18th PDPA Central Committee plenum. He was succeeded in his post by Najibullah.[81]
Karmal still had support within the party, and used his base to curb Najibullah's powers. He began spreading rumors that he would be reappointed General Secretary. Najibullah's power base was in the
Later life and death
Many years after the end of his leadership, he denounced the Saur Revolution of 1978 in which he took part, taking aim at the Khalq governments of Taraki and Amin. He told a Soviet reporter:
It was the greatest crime against the people of Afghanistan. Parcham's leaders were against armed actions because the country was not ready for a revolution... I knew that people would not support us if we decided to keep power without such support.[84]
Karmal was invited back to Kabul by Najibullah, and "for equally obscure reasons Karmal accepted",[85] returning on 20 June 1991 (this could have been on the recommendation of Anahita Ratebzad who was very close to Karmal and also respected by Najibullah). If Najibullah's plan was to strengthen his position within the Watan Party (the renamed PDPA) by appeasing the pro-Karmal Parchamites, he failed – Karmal's apartment became a center for opposition to Najibullah's government. When Najibullah was toppled in 1992, Karmal became the most powerful politician in Kabul through leadership of the Parcham. However, his negotiations with the rebels collapsed quickly, and on 16 April 1992 the rebels, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, took Kabul.[86] After the fall of Najibullah's government, Karmal was based in Hairatan. There, it is alleged, Karmal used most of his time either trying to establish a new party, or advising people to join the secular National Islamic Movement (Junbish-i-Milli). Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of Junbish-i-Milli, was a supporter of Karmal during his rule. It is unknown how much control Karmal had over Dostum, but there is little evidence that Karmal was in any commanding position. Karmal's influence over Dostum appeared indirect – some of his former associates supported Dostum. Those who spoke with Karmal during this period noted his lack of interest in politics.[87] In June 1992 it was reported that he had died in a plane crash along with Dostum, although these reports later proved to be false.[88]
In early December 1996, Karmal died in Moscow's
[he] committed all kinds of crimes during his illegitimate rule ... God inflicted on him various kinds of hardship and pain. Eventually he died of cancer in a hospital belonging to his paymasters, the Russians.[89]
Notes
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