Burhanuddin Harahap
Burhanuddin Harahap | |
---|---|
Minister of Defense | |
In office 12 August 1955 – 24 March 1956 | |
President | Sukarno |
Prime Minister | Himself |
Preceded by | Iwa Koesoemasoemantri |
Succeeded by | Ali Sastroamidjojo |
Personal details | |
Born | [a] Medan, Dutch East Indies | 12 February 1917
Died | 14 June 1987 Jakarta, Indonesia | (aged 70)
Resting place | Tanah Kusir Cemetery |
Political party | Masyumi |
Alma mater | Gadjah Mada |
Burhanuddin Harahap (
He was born into a
In 1953, Burhanuddin contributed to the collapse of Prime Minister
Political tensions forced him to flee to Sumatra in 1957, and he joined PRRI upon its declaration in February 1958. Within PRRI, Burhanuddin was appointed minister of defense and justice in the revolutionary government's declared cabinet. Following continued military setbacks of the movement, the movement's leaders retreated into the jungles and mountains, and by August 1961 Burhanuddin had surrendered to authorities. Initially permitted to remain free, he was arrested in March 1962 and imprisoned until Sukarno's fall in 1966. Following his release, he largely left politics, although he took part in the 1980 Petition of Fifty documents, which criticized President Suharto's use of Pancasila against political opponents before he died in 1987.
Early life and career
Burhanuddin was born in
During his time in Yogyakarta, Burhanuddin joined the Jong Islamieten Bond in 1936, becoming its activist and local chair. When he moved to Batavia, he became the secretary of the Studenten Islam Studie-Club, an organization that had split off from the Bond in 1934. He also became a member of the Indonesian Students' Association .[2][9] Along with Jusuf Wibisono and Mohammad Roem, Burhanuddin organized the publication of the Dutch-language journal Moslim Reveil espousing Indonesian Islamic nationalism.[10]
Early political career
Between 1942 and 1948, Burhanuddin served as a public prosecutor in the Jakarta State Court and later the Yogyakarta State Court.
Burhanuddin was also initially appointed as Masyumi's representative to the Central Electoral Committee in April 1953 during the
Prime Minister: 1955–1956
Cabinet formation
Burhanuddin, who was a relative of acting army chief of staff Zulkifli Lubis, was then appointed as the new formateur. After negotiations, he secured a major concession from PNI – a willingness to accept a Masyumi prime minister – but could not reach a deal on appointed ministers. While Burhanuddin and PNI had agreed on which positions would be occupied by PNI ministers, Burhanuddin would not accept PNI's candidates, and vice versa with PNI on Burhanuddin's appointments. Burhanuddin then turned to the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and several minor political parties,[b] and his cabinet was sworn in on 12 August 1955 – Burhanuddin serving as both prime minister and defense minister.[21][c] His cabinet had 23 ministers – more than all previous cabinets.[23] Most of the ministers – except Finance Minister Sumitro and Agriculture Minister Mohammad Sardjan – also had no previous cabinet experience.[24]
Domestic policy and the 1955 election
It was intended that the cabinet would return its mandate after the upcoming elections had concluded, effectively making it a caretaker government and limiting its ability to influence long-term policy.
The Burhanuddin cabinet successfully passed a draft electoral law that would regulate the 1955 election.[31] In the weeks leading up to the 1955 election, the cabinet also made several populist policies, including reducing petrol prices by nearly half and simplifying import regulations.[32] While several members of the cabinet had argued for delaying elections, it was decided that the election would be mostly held on schedule, on 29 September 1955.[33] Although initially many expected that Masyumi would come in first,[34] the election produced a weak result for Masyumi with PNI instead winning the most seats while NU's position in the parliament was strengthened. This complicated the coalition between the two especially with Masyumi's minor party allies being wiped out of parliament and the PSI losing most of its seats.[35] While Burhanuddin's coalition still held a narrow majority in parliament, NU and PSII now held much more sway. As a result of the shifting balance of political power, Masyumi opted to back out from supporting an anticorruption bill in parliament, which could have antagonized the NU and received a presidential veto.[36][37] Under NU pressure, Burhanuddin also agreed to appoint Abdul Haris Nasution – who had previously lost his post due to the 17 October affair in 1952 – back to his old position as army chief of staff.[38] Before this, Burhanuddin already liked Nasution personally – they were both of South Tapanuli descent – and had offered him a post in his cabinet.[5]
Even with the changed political situation, Burhanuddin's cabinet continued to remove PNI and PKI-supporting personnel from civilian and military offices alike – at the cost of reduced performance of the ministries.[39] An incident in December 1955 where Burhanuddin attempted to appoint an officer, Sujono, to the Indonesian Air Force high command resulted in the resignation of its chief of staff Soerjadi Soerjadarma. During the intended swearing-in, several Air Force NCOs stormed the ceremony (attended by several foreign dignitaries and military attaches) to beat up Sujono and several officers supporting him, and they also stole the Air Force's standard. After the incident, Burhanuddin ordered the house arrest of Soerjadarma. This brought the cabinet into political conflict with Sukarno which it lost – the appointment was reversed and the resignation was not accepted.[40]
Economic and foreign policy
Burhanuddin's cabinet engaged in rationalization efforts, reversing the economic policies of PNI in favor of a pragmatic approach that welcomed foreign and private capital into Indonesia. Additionally, to curb the high inflation that was in place during 1955, the cabinet opted to liberalize imports which had been largely restricted to curb deficits by prior administrations. These policies resulted in the stabilization of prices, although imports did increase significantly.
In foreign policy, the Burhanuddin cabinet aimed to placate the concerns of the United States about Indonesia's relations with the communist bloc to gain American support in the
With the cabinet set to dissolve in March 1956 – one month earlier than previously scheduled – personnel changes and grants of government loans were intensified throughout February, with a walkout of opposition parties including the speaker of parliament Sartono on 28 February. Burhanuddin returned his mandate to Sukarno on 3 March 1956, and for the next three weeks, it served as a demissionary cabinet.[54][55] The Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet succeeded it and included both Masyumi and NU within the cabinet,[56] but excluded most former ministers of the Burhanuddin government including Burhanuddin himself.[57] Ali also succeeded Burhanuddin as defense minister within his cabinet.[58] Increased tensions between the coalition parties resulted in Masyumi's withdrawal from the cabinet in January 1957, and in the ensuing two months of political crisis, Burhanuddin offered a proposal whereas Sukarno would play a more important role in day-to-day politics and attend cabinet meetings. This proposal did not pass, however, and the Ali cabinet collapsed in March 1957.[59]
PRRI rebellion
In late 1957, the political situation in Indonesia rapidly grew unfavorable – the failure of the United Nations General Assembly to take up the Western New Guinea dispute had resulted in Sukarno forcefully nationalizing Dutch companies and property, and an unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on Sukarno, killing many children.[60][61] Burhanuddin and other Masyumi leaders were especially in the spotlight, due to his cabinet's economic policy which was perceived to have benefited foreign importers and Chinese Indonesians.[62] Burhanuddin, along with other Masyumi leaders such as Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, were investigated for the assassination attempt. Indonesian newspapers began to attack the three figures, and rumors spread that they had been killed or arrested – some of Burhanuddin's family members travelled from Sumatra to Jakarta, believing that he had died.[60][61] In early December 1957, Burhanuddin opted to flee Jakarta when he heard that he would be arrested. Within the following month, the other leaders followed him.[60][63]
Under the auspices of visiting a friend, Burhanuddin was in Padang in mid-January 1958, and along with other Masyumi leaders, he attended a conference at the town of Sungai Dareh with dissident military officers.[64] In later accounts, Burhanuddin claimed that the military officers were advocating Sumatran secession from Indonesia, which he and other civilian leaders opposed.[65][66] In the following weeks, with Sukarno abroad, the government in Jakarta under Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja attempted to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict, with Masyumi members who had not fled to Sumatra – such as Roem – attempting to persuade Natsir, Sjafruddin, and Burhanuddin not to form a subversive government.[67][68] On 10 February 1958, the dissident military officers under Ahmad Husein issued an ultimatum to the central government – the dissolution of the Djuanda Cabinet and the formation of a new cabinet by Vice President Hatta and Defense Minister Hamengkubuwono IX.[68][69] When the central government rejected the ultimatum, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) was declared on 15 February 1958 in Padang. Burhanuddin was appointed as minister of defense and justice in the government's declared cabinet.[68][69] Burhanuddin later claimed that he was not fully in favor of forming a rival government, that he had only agreed to be appointed minister of home affairs simply so there could be a cabinet, and that the military officers had reassigned him without consultation.[70][71]
The rebellion soon faced major military defeats against the Indonesian government, which had captured the major rebel-held cities of Padang, Medan, and Pekanbaru by May 1958 while facing comparatively little armed resistance. This also brought down any possibility of a foreign intervention – namely of the United States which had unrealized hopes for a general uprising against Sukarno.[72][73] PRRI soon was forced into guerilla warfare, with Burhanuddin being attached to Dahlan Djambek's northern sector based in Agam Regency.[74] Due to continued government military pressure, however, they were soon dislodged from their bases there and into the jungles and mountains of Sumatra, with the final major PRRI stronghold of Koto Tinggi being taken in July 1960. After the loss of their base, PRRI's civilian leaders could no longer exercise any control over the movement.[75]
By 1961, Army Chief of Staff Abdul Haris Nasution was negotiating with the rebel army officers, offering general amnesty. With Husein surrendering his forces on 21 June, most of the civilian leaders realized that the movement was hopeless. On 17 August 1961, Sukarno offered another general amnesty for any PRRI members who surrendered before 5 October 1961. Along with Sjafruddin and Assaat, Burhanuddin first called for PRRI forces to cease hostilities against the Indonesian government, before surrendering to military authorities at Padangsidempuan in late August 1961.[76][77] PRRI's leadership was now reduced to just Natsir and Djambek, and with the death of the latter in September, Natsir surrendered too, ending the rebellion.[78] Burhanuddin was initially brought to Medan after Natsir's surrender and was initially permitted to remain free. However, he was arrested along with the other PRRI civilian leaders in March 1962 and brought to Jakarta, before being separated from the others and incarcerated in Pati Regency for two years. He was brought back to Jakarta for continued imprisonment in 1964. He would be released following the fall of Sukarno, being let out along with other Masyumi leaders in July 1966.[79]
Later life and death
After his release, there were attempts by former Masyumi leaders to reform the party – and Burhanuddin along with the other leaders attended a meeting of
He died in Jakarta's Harapan Kita Cardiac Hospital on 14 June 1987, after having suffered from heart problems since 1976. He was buried in the Tanah Kusir Cemetery.[3][84]
Personal life and family
Burhanuddin was described as a fan of tennis and sambal, the former since his time as a student in Yogyakarta.[82][85] He married Siti Bariyah, the daughter of a local official in Yogyakarta.[86][87] The couple is known to have a son and a daughter, and no grandchildren at the time of Burhanuddin's death.[87]
See also
- List of prime ministers of Indonesia
Footnotes
- ^ a b His biographies state 12 February,[1][2] while his gravestone states 12 March.[3]
- Parindra.[21]
- Iwa Kusumasumantri, had resigned on 13 July 1955 due to the aforementioned tensions with the army.[22]
- Kartosuwiryo since at least 1952.[28]
- ^ NU and PSII derived most of their voter base from Javanese Muslims, while Masyumi mostly received support from the Sundanese and from outside Java.[30]
References
Citations
- ^ a b c Busyairi 1989, p. 6.
- ^ Ministry of Information of Indonesia. 1952. p. 94. Archivedfrom the original on 6 April 2022. Retrieved 6 April 2022.
- ^ a b "Menjelajahi Rumah Terakhir 10 Mantan Perdana Menteri". detiknews (in Indonesian). 16 August 2006. Archived from the original on 5 November 2021. Retrieved 5 April 2022.
- ^ a b Fogg 2019, p. 173.
- ^ a b Kahin 2012, p. 126.
- ^ Busyairi 1989, p. 8.
- ^ Busyairi 1989, p. 9.
- ^ Busyairi 1989, p. 14.
- ^ a b Madinier 2015, pp. 47–48.
- ^ Ardanareswari, Indira (14 June 2020). Jusuf, Windu (ed.). "Pemilu Pertama Indonesia Terlaksana Berkat Burhanuddin Harahap". tirto.id (in Indonesian). Archived from the original on 12 March 2021. Retrieved 6 April 2022.
- ^ a b Fogg 2019, pp. 176–177.
- ^ Fogg 2019, pp. 118–119.
- ^ Feith 2006, p. 152.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 280–281.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 291–292.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 331–336.
- ^ Karma 1987, p. 16.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 336–339.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 398–402.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 416–417.
- ^ a b Feith 2006, pp. 417–419.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 400–401.
- ^ a b c Lucius 2003, pp. 130–131.
- ^ Thuỷ 2019, p. 126.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 421–422.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 420–421.
- ^ Formichi 2012, p. 163.
- ^ Madinier 2015, p. 174.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 422–423.
- ^ a b Lucius 2003, pp. 133–135.
- ^ Kahin 2012, p. 85.
- ^ Feith 2006, p. 426.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 424–425.
- ^ Kahin 1999, p. 177.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 434–436.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 437–439.
- ^ Lucius 2003, p. 136.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 442–443.
- ^ Feith 2006, p. 446.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 447–448.
- ^ Thuỷ 2019, pp. 135–136.
- ^ Feith 2006, p. 563.
- ^ Feith 2006, p. 461.
- ^ Thuỷ 2019, pp. 147–148.
- ^ Madinier 2015, pp. 160–161.
- ^ Lucius 2003, pp. 131–132.
- ^ Lucius 2003, p. 148.
- ^ Madinier 2015, pp. 182–183.
- ^ Penders 2021, p. 251.
- ^ Penders 2021, pp. 253–254.
- ^ Madinier 2015, pp. 141–142.
- ^ Penders 2021, p. 256.
- ^ Feith 2006, p. 455.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 456–459.
- ^ Busyairi 1989, p. 186.
- ^ Kahin 2012, pp. 98–99.
- ^ Feith 2006, p. 467.
- ^ Feith 2006, pp. 469–470.
- ^ Madinier 2015, pp. 232–237.
- ^ a b c Kahin 1999, pp. 204–205.
- ^ a b Madinier 2015, pp. 248–249.
- ^ Madinier 2015, p. 225.
- ^ Madinier 2015, p. 249.
- ^ Madinier 2015, p. 250.
- ^ Busyairi 1989, p. 145.
- ^ Madinier 2015, p. 251.
- ^ Kahin 1999, p. 208.
- ^ a b c Madinier 2015, p. 252.
- ^ a b Kahin 1999, pp. 210–211.
- ^ Busyairi 1989, p. 153.
- ^ Madinier 2015, p. 253.
- ^ Kahin 1999, pp. 214–216.
- ^ Madinier 2015, p. 257.
- ^ Kahin 1999, p. 218.
- ^ Kahin 1999, p. 225.
- ^ Madinier 2015, p. 260.
- ^ Kahin 1999, p. 226.
- ^ Kahin 1999, p. 227.
- ^ Subarkah, Muhammad, ed. (19 January 2019). "0rde Lama, Syahrir, Natsir, Hamka:Penjara Tanpa Proses Hukum". Republika (in Indonesian). Archived from the original on 14 November 2021. Retrieved 5 April 2022.
- ^ Ward 2010, pp. 62–68.
- ^ Ward 2010, p. 64.
- ^ a b Karma 1987, p. 17.
- ^ Kahin 2012, pp. 198–199.
- ^ Karma 1987, pp. 13, 19.
- ^ Busyairi 1989, p. 11.
- ^ Busyairi 1989, pp. 30–31.
- ^ a b Karma 1987, p. 18.
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