Political integration of India

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Political subdivisions of the Indian Empire in 1909 with British India (pink) and the princely states (yellow)

Before

British Crown, with control over their internal affairs remaining in the hands of their hereditary rulers. The latter included 562 princely states which had different types of revenue-sharing arrangements with the British, often depending on their size, population and local conditions. In addition, there were several colonial enclaves controlled by France and Portugal. After independence, the political integration of these territories into an Indian Union was a declared objective of the Indian National Congress, and the Government of India
pursued this over the next decade.

In July 1946,

British India and those that had been princely states. Simultaneously, the Government of India, through a combination of military and diplomatic means, acquired de facto and de jure
control over the remaining colonial enclaves, which too were integrated into India.

Although this process successfully integrated the vast majority of princely states into India, it was not as successful for a few, notably the former princely states of Jammu and Kashmir and Manipur, where active secessionist and separatist insurgencies continued to exist due to various reasons.

Princely states in India

The early history of British expansion in India was characterised by the co-existence of two approaches towards the existing princely states.

suzerain, but at the same time respected and protected them as allies, taking control of their external relations.[8] The exact relations between the British and each princely state were regulated by individual treaties and varied widely, with some states having complete internal self-government, others being subject to significant control in their internal affairs, and some rulers being in effect little more than the owners of landed estates, with little autonomy.[9]

During the 20th century, the British made several attempts to integrate the princely states more closely with British India, in 1921 creating the

Second World War.[13] As a result, in the 1940s the relationship between the princely states and the crown remained regulated by the principle of paramountcy and by the various treaties between the British crown and the states.[14]

Neither paramountcy nor the subsidiary alliances could continue after Indian independence. The British took the view that because they had been established directly between the British crown and the princely states, they could not be transferred to the newly independent dominions of India and Pakistan.[15] At the same time, the alliances imposed obligations on Britain that it was not prepared to continue to carry out, such as the obligation to maintain troops in India for the defence of the princely states. The British government therefore decided that paramountcy, together with all treaties between them and the princely states, would come to an end upon the British departure from India.[16]

Reasons for integration

The Saurashtra and Kathiawar regions of Gujarat were home to over two hundred princely states, many with non-contiguous territories, as this map of Baroda shows.

The termination of paramountcy meant that all rights flowing from the states' relationship with the British crown would return to them, leaving them free to negotiate relationships with the new states of India and Pakistan "on a basis of complete freedom".

Mohandas Gandhi,[21] were sympathetic to the more progressive princes as examples of the capacity of Indians to rule themselves.[22] This changed in the 1930s as a result of the federation scheme contained in the Government of India Act 1935 and the rise of socialist Congress leaders such as Jayaprakash Narayan, and the Congress began to actively engage with popular political and labour activity in the princely states.[23] By 1939, the Congress's formal stance was that the states must enter independent India, on the same terms and with the same autonomy as the provinces of British India, and with their people granted responsible government.[24] As a result, it attempted to insist on the incorporation of the princely states into India in its negotiations with the British,[25] but the British took the view that this was not in their power to grant.[citation needed
]

A few British leaders, particularly

viceroy of India, were also uncomfortable with breaking links between independent India and the princely states. The development of trade, commerce and communications during the 19th and 20th centuries had bound the princely states to the British India through a complex network of interests.[26] Agreements relating to railways, customs, irrigation, use of ports, and other similar agreements would get terminated, posing a serious threat to the economic life of the subcontinent. Mountbatten was also persuaded by the argument of Indian officials such as V. P. Menon that the integration of the princely states into independent India would, to some extent, assuage the wounds of partition. The result was that Mountbatten personally favoured and worked towards the accession of princely states to India following the transfer of power, as proposed by the Congress.[27]

Accepting integration

The princes' position

The rulers of the princely states were not uniformly enthusiastic about integrating their domains into independent India. The

Hyderabad announced that they did not intend to join either dominion.[30] Hyderabad went as far as to appoint trade representatives in European countries and commencing negotiations with the Portuguese to lease or buy Goa to give it access to the sea,[31] and Travancore pointed to the strategic importance to Western countries of its thorium reserves while asking for recognition.[32] Some states proposed a subcontinent-wide confederation of princely states, as a third entity in addition to India and Pakistan.[33] Bhopal attempted to build an alliance between the princely states and the Muslim League to counter the pressure being put on rulers by the Congress.[34]

A number of factors contributed to the collapse of this initial resistance and to nearly all non-Muslim majority princely states agreeing to accede to India. An important factor was the lack of unity among the princes. The smaller states did not trust the larger states to protect their interests, and many

Jodhpur, Patiala and Rewa took their seats in the Assembly.[38]

Many princes were also pressured by popular sentiment favouring integration with India, which meant their plans for independence had little support from their subjects.[39] The Maharaja of Travancore, for example, definitively abandoned his plans for independence after the attempted assassination of his dewan, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Iyer.[40] In a few states, the chief ministers or dewans played a significant role in convincing the princes to accede to India.[41] The key factors that led the states to accept integration into India were, however, the efforts of Lord Mountbatten, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and V. P. Menon. The latter two were respectively the political and administrative heads of the States Department, which was in charge of relations with the princely states.

Mountbatten's role

Lord Louis Mountbatten played an important role in convincing reluctant monarchs to accede to the Indian Union.

Mountbatten believed that securing the states' accession to India was crucial to reaching a negotiated settlement with the Congress for the transfer of power.

Governor General of the Dominion of India.[43]

Mountbatten used his influence with the princes to push them towards accession. He declared that the British Government would not grant dominion status to any of the princely states, nor would it accept them into the

communal violence and communist movements.[40]

Mountbatten stressed that he would act as the trustee of the princes' commitment, as he would be serving as India's head of state well into 1948. He engaged in a personal dialogue with reluctant princes, such as the Nawab of Bhopal, who he asked through a confidential letter to sign the Instrument of Accession making Bhopal part of India, which Mountbatten would keep locked up in his safe. It would be handed to the States Department on 15 August only if the Nawab did not change his mind before then, which he was free to do. The Nawab agreed, and did not renege over the deal.[46]

At the time, several princes complained that they were being betrayed by Britain, who they regarded as an ally,[47] and Sir Conrad Corfield resigned his position as head of the Political Department in protest at Mountbatten's policies.[40] Mountbatten's policies were also criticised by the opposition Conservative Party.[48] Winston Churchill compared the language used by the Indian government with that used by Adolf Hitler before the invasion of Austria.[49] Modern historians such as E. W. R. Lumby and R. J. Moore, however, take the view that Mountbatten played a crucial role in ensuring that the princely states agreed to accede to India.[50]

Pressure and diplomacy

Vallabhbhai Patel as Minister for Home and States Affairs had the responsibility of welding the British Indian provinces and the princely states into a united India.

By far the most significant factor that led to the princes' decision to accede to India was the policy of the Congress and, in particular, of Patel and Menon. The Congress' stated position was that the princely states were not sovereign entities, and as such could not opt to be independent notwithstanding the end of paramountcy. The princely states must therefore accede to either India or Pakistan.[51] In July 1946, Nehru pointedly observed that no princely state could prevail militarily against the army of independent India.[40] In January 1947, he said that independent India would not accept the divine right of kings,[52] and in May 1947, he declared that any princely state which refused to join the Constituent Assembly would be treated as an enemy state.[40] Other Congress leaders, such as C. Rajagopalachari, argued that as paramountcy "came into being as a fact and not by agreement", it would necessarily pass to the government of independent India, as the successor of the British.[53]

Patel and Menon, who were charged with the actual job of negotiating with the princes, took a more conciliatory approach than Nehru.[54] The official policy statement of the Government of India made by Patel on 5 July 1947 made no threats. Instead, it emphasised the unity of India and the common interests of the princes and independent India, reassured them about the Congress' intentions, and invited them to join independent India "to make laws sitting together as friends than to make treaties as aliens".[55] He reiterated that the States Department would not attempt to establish a relationship of domination over the princely states. Unlike the Political Department of the British Government, it would not be an instrument of paramountcy, but a medium whereby business could be conducted between the states and India as equals.[56]

Instruments of accession

Patel and Menon backed up their diplomatic efforts by producing treaties that were designed to be attractive to rulers of princely states. Two key documents were produced. The first was the

residuary powers and jurisdiction in the Government of India. Rulers of states which had an intermediate status signed a third type of Instrument, which preserved the degree of power they had under the British.[57]

The Instruments of Accession implemented a number of other safeguards. Clause 7 provided that the princes would not be bound to the

British honours and decorations.[59] In discussions, Lord Mountbatten reinforced the statements of Patel and Menon by emphasising that the documents gave the princes all the "practical independence" they needed.[60] Mountbatten, Patel and Menon also sought to give princes the impression that if they did not accept the terms put to them then, they might subsequently need to accede on substantially less favourable terms.[61] The Standstill Agreement was also used as a negotiating tool, as the States Department categorically ruled out signing a Standstill Agreement with princely states that did not sign an Instrument of Accession.[62]

Accession process

1946 political map of India, showing princely states (in gray) and British India

The limited scope of the Instruments of Accession and the promise of a wide-ranging autonomy and the other guarantees they offered, gave sufficient comfort to many rulers, who saw this as the best deal they could strike given the lack of support from the British, and popular internal pressures.

Hyderabad and Kashmir, which decided to remain independent.[65]

Border states

The ruler of

Punjab. He offered to permit Jodhpur and Jaisalmer to accede to Pakistan on any terms they chose, giving their rulers blank sheets of paper and asking them to write down their terms, which he would sign.[66] Jaisalmer refused, arguing that it would be difficult for him to side with Muslims against Hindus in the event of communal problems. Hanwant Singh came close to signing. However, the atmosphere in Jodhpur was in general hostile to accession to Pakistan. Mountbatten also pointed out that the accession of a predominantly Hindu state to Pakistan would violate the principle of the two-nation theory on which Pakistan was based, and was likely to cause communal violence in the State. Hanwant Singh was persuaded by these arguments, and somewhat reluctantly agreed to accede to India.[67]

In the northeast India, the border states of Manipur and Tripura acceded to India on 11 August and 13 August respectively.[68][69]

Junagadh

Main article: Annexation of Junagadh

Although the states were in theory free to choose whether they wished to accede to India or Pakistan, Mountbatten had pointed out that "geographic compulsions" meant that most of them must choose India. In effect, he took the position that only the states that shared a border with Pakistan could choose to accede to it.[64]

The Nawab of Junagadh, a princely state located on the south-western end of Gujarat and having no common border with Pakistan, chose to accede to Pakistan ignoring Mountbatten's views, arguing that it could be reached from Pakistan by sea. The rulers of two states that were subject to the suzerainty of Junagadh—Mangrol and Babariawad—reacted to this by declaring their independence from Junagadh and acceding to India. In response, the Nawab of Junagadh militarily occupied the states. The rulers of neighbouring states reacted angrily, sending their troops to the Junagadh frontier and appealed to the Government of India for assistance. A group of Junagadhi people, led by Samaldas Gandhi, formed a government-in-exile, the Aarzi Hukumat ("provisional government").[70]

India believed that if Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, the communal tension already simmering in Gujarat would worsen, and refused to accept the accession. The government pointed out that the state was 80% Hindu, and called for a referendum to decide the question of accession. Simultaneously, they cut off supplies of fuel and coal to Junagadh, severed air and postal links, sent troops to the frontier, and reoccupied the principalities of Mangrol and Babariawad that had acceded to India.[71] Pakistan agreed to discuss a plebiscite, subject to the withdrawal of Indian troops, a condition India rejected. On 26 October, the Nawab and his family fled to Pakistan following clashes with Indian troops. On 7 November, Junagadh's court, facing collapse, invited the Government of India to take over the State's administration. The Government of India agreed.[72] A plebiscite was conducted in February 1948, which went almost unanimously in favour of accession to India.[73]

Jammu and Kashmir

Main article: Kashmir conflict
See also: Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus and Incorporation of Azad Kashmir as nominally self-governing state of Pakistan
Shown in green is the Kashmiri region under Pakistani control. The dark-brown region represents Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir while the Aksai Chin is under Chinese administration.

At the time of the transfer of power, the state of Jammu and Kashmir (widely called "Kashmir") was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu, although the state itself had a Muslim majority. Hari Singh was equally hesitant about acceding to either India or Pakistan, as either would have provoked adverse reactions in parts of his kingdom.[74] He signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan and proposed one with India as well,[75] but announced that Kashmir intended to remain independent.[64] However, his rule was opposed by Sheikh Abdullah, the popular leader of Kashmir's largest political party, the National Conference, who demanded his abdication.[75]

Pakistan, attempting to force the issue of Kashmir's accession, cut off supplies and transport links. Its transport links with India were tenuous and flooded during the rainy season. Thus Kashmir's only links with the two dominions was by air. Rumours about atrocities against the Muslim population of

interim government headed by Sheikh Abdullah in return.[77] The Maharaja complied, but Nehru declared that it would have to be confirmed by a plebiscite, although there was no legal requirement to seek such confirmation.[78]

Indian troops secured

Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In the 1962 Sino-Indian War, China occupied Aksai Chin, the north-eastern region bordering Ladakh, which it continues to control and administer.[81]

Hyderabad

Main article: Annexation of Hyderabad
Not to be confused with Hyderabad which is also a city in Sindh province of Pakistan.
Hyderabad State in 1909. Its former territories are today incorporated in the Indian states of Telangana, Karnataka and Maharashtra.
Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri at Secunderabad
.

Hyderabad was a landlocked state that stretched over 82,000 square miles (over 212,000 square kilometres) in southeastern India. While 87% of its 17 million people were Hindu, its ruler

firman announcing that on the transfer of power, his state would be resuming independence.[83] The Government of India rejected the firman, terming it a "legalistic claim of doubtful validity". It argued that the strategic location of Hyderabad, which lay astride the main lines of communication between northern and southern India, meant it could easily be used by "foreign interests" to threaten India, and that in consequence, the issue involved national-security concerns. It also pointed out that the state's people, history and location made it unquestionably Indian, and that its own "common interests" therefore mandated its integration into India.[84]

The Nizam was prepared to enter into a limited treaty with India, which gave Hyderabad safeguards not provided for in the standard Instrument of Accession, such as a provision guaranteeing Hyderabad's neutrality in the event of a conflict between India and Pakistan. India rejected this proposal, arguing that other states would demand similar concessions. A temporary Standstill Agreement was signed as a stopgap measure, even though Hyderabad had not yet agreed to accede to India.[85] By December 1947, however, India was accusing Hyderabad of repeatedly violating the Agreement, while the Nizam alleged that India was blockading his state, a charge India denied.[86]

The Nizam was also beset by the

UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice.[90] Patel now insisted that if Hyderabad was allowed to continue its independence, the prestige of the Government would be tarnished and then neither Hindus nor Muslims would feel secure in its realm.[91]

On 13 September 1948, the

Operation Polo on the grounds that the law and order situation there threatened the peace of South India. The troops met little resistance by the Razakars and between 13 and 18 September took complete control of the state. The operation led to massive communal violence with estimates of deaths ranging from the official one of 27,000–40,000 to scholarly ones of 200,000 or more.[92][93] The Nizam was retained as the head of state in the same manner as the other princes who acceded to India.[94] He thereupon disavowed the complaints that had been made to the UN and, despite vehement protests from Pakistan and strong criticism from other countries, the Security Council did not deal further with the question, and Hyderabad was absorbed into India.[95]

Completing integration

Central Provinces and Berar, which form part of modern Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra
Madras Province
and adjacent princely states
The Madras Presidency was divided and merged with neighbouring princely states to produce Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.

The Instruments of Accession were limited, transferring control of only three matters to India, and would by themselves have produced a rather loose federation, with significant differences in administration and governance across the various states. Full political integration, in contrast, would require a process whereby the political actors in the various states were "persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center", namely, the

Republic of India.[96] This was not an easy task. While some princely states such as Mysore had legislative systems of governance that were based on a broad franchise and not significantly different from those of British India,[97] in others, political decision-making took place in small, limited aristocratic circles and governance was, as a result, at best paternalistic and at worst the result of courtly intrigue.[98] Having secured the accession of the princely states, the Government of India between 1948 and 1950 turned to the task of welding the states and the former British provinces into one polity under a single republican constitution.[99]

Fast-track integration

The first step in this process carried out between 1947 and 1950, was to merge the smaller states that were not seen by the Government of India to be viable administrative units either into neighbouring provinces, or with other princely states to create a "princely union".[100] This policy was contentious since it involved the dissolution of the very states whose existence India had only recently guaranteed in the Instruments of Accession.[101][failed verification] Patel and Menon emphasised that without integration, the economies of states would collapse, and anarchy would arise if the princes were unable to provide democracy and govern properly. They pointed out that many of the smaller states were very small and lacked resources to sustain their economies and support their growing populations. Many also imposed tax rules and other restrictions impeding free trade, which had to be dismantled in a united India.[101][failed verification]

Given that the merger involved the breach of guarantees personally given by Mountbatten, initially, Patel and Nehru intended to wait until after his term as

Punjab Hill States Agency which lay near the international border and had signed Merger Agreements were integrated into Himachal Pradesh, a distinct entity that was administered directly by the centre as a Chief Commissioner's Province, for reasons of security.[104]

The Merger Agreements required rulers to cede "full and exclusive jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to governance" of their state to the

privy purse as compensation for the surrender of their powers and the dissolution of their states. While state property would be taken over, their private property would be protected, as would all personal privileges, dignities and titles. Succession was also guaranteed according to custom. In addition, the provincial administration was obliged to take on the staff of the princely states with guarantees of equal pay and treatment.[105]

A second kind of 'merger' agreement was demanded from larger states along sensitive border areas:

Bhakra dam.[104]

Four-step integration

Merger

The bulk of the larger states, and some groups of small states, were integrated through a different, four-step process. The first step in this process was to convince adjacent large states and a large number of adjacent small states to combine to form a "princely union" through the execution by their rulers of Covenants of Merger. Under the Covenants of Merger, all rulers lost their ruling powers, save one who became the

privy purse and guarantees similar to those provided under the Merger Agreements.[106]

Through this process, Patel obtained the unification of 222 states in the

Travancore-Cochin.[111] The only princely states which signed neither Covenants of Merger nor Merger Agreements were Kashmir, Mysore and Hyderabad.[112]

Democratisation

Merging the administrative machineries of each state and integrating them into one political and administrative entity was not easy, particularly as many of the merged states had a history of rivalry. In the former

Governors of the former British provinces,[115] thus giving the people of their territories the same measure of responsible government as the people of the rest of India.[114]

The result of this process has been described as being, in effect, an assertion of paramountcy by the Government of India over the states in a more pervasive form.[116] While this contradicted the British statement that paramountcy would lapse on the transfer of power, the Congress position had always been that independent India would inherit the position of being the paramount power.[53]

States of India in 1950

Centralisation and constitutionalisation

Democratisation still left open one important distinction between the former princely states and the former British provinces, namely, that since the princely states had signed limited Instruments of Accession covering only three subjects, they were insulated from government policies in other areas. The Congress viewed this as hampering its ability to frame policies that brought about

state's Constituent Assembly
.

Effective from 1950, the Constitution of India classified the constituent units of India into three classes—Part A, B, and C states. The former British provinces, together with the princely states that had been merged into them, were the Part A states. The princely unions, plus Mysore and Hyderabad, were the Part B states. The former Chief Commissioners' Provinces and other centrally administered areas, except the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, were the Part C states.[118] The only practical difference between the Part A states and the Part B states was that the constitutional heads of the Part B states were the Rajpramukhs appointed under the terms of the Covenants of Merger, rather than Governors appointed by the central government. In addition, Constitution gave the central government a significant range of powers over the former princely states, providing amongst other things that "their governance shall be under the general control of, and comply with such particular directions, if any, as may from time to time be given by, the President". Apart from that, the form of government in both was identical.[116]

Reorganisation

The distinction between Part A and Part B states was only intended to last for a brief, transitional period. In 1956, the

union territories". The Rajpramukhs lost their authority, and were replaced as the constitutional heads of state by Governors, who were appointed by the central government. These changes finally brought the princely order to an end.[119] In both legal and practical terms, the territories that had been part of the princely states were now fully integrated into India and did not differ in any way from those that had been part of British India.[120] The personal privileges of the princes—the privy purse, the exemption from customs duty, and customary dignities—survived, only to be abolished in 1971.[121]

Post-integration issues

The princes

See also: Privy Purse in India; Central Waqf Council; Custodian for Enemy Property for India; and Enemy Property Act, 1968

Although the progressive integration of the princely states into India was largely peaceful, not all princes were happy with the outcome. Many had expected the Instruments of Accession to be permanent, and were unhappy about losing the

Col. Krishna Kumarasingh Bhavasingh Gohil, for example, became the Governor of Madras State,[123] and several others were appointed to diplomatic posts overseas.[119]

Colonial enclaves

The French enclaves in 1947[image reference needed]
See also: French India and Portuguese India

The integration of the princely states raised the question of the future of the remaining colonial

French National Assembly in May 1962, de jure control of the enclaves was also transferred.[126]

Demonstrators demanding the integration of Goa into India march against the Portuguese on 15 August 1955.

Portugal, in contrast, resisted diplomatic solutions. It viewed its continued possession of its enclaves in the Indian subcontinent as a matter of national pride[127] and, in 1951, it amended its constitution to convert its possessions in India into Portuguese provinces.[128] In July 1954, an uprising in Dadra and Nagar Haveli threw off Portuguese rule.[127] The Portuguese attempted to send forces from Daman to reoccupy the enclaves, but were prevented from doing so by Indian troops. Portugal initiated proceedings before the International Court of Justice to compel India to allow its troops access to the enclave, but the Court rejected its complaint in 1960, holding that India was within its rights in denying Portugal military access.[129] In 1961, the Constitution of India was amended to incorporate Dadra and Nagar Haveli into India as a Union Territory.[130]

Goa, Daman and Diu remained an outstanding issue. On 15 August 1955, five thousand non-violent demonstrators marched against the Portuguese at the border, and were met with gunfire, killing 22.

Goa was incorporated into India as a centrally administered union territory and, in 1987, became a state.[135]

Sikkim

The former princely state of Sikkim, located at a strategically important point on the border between India and China, was integrated into India in 1975 as its 22nd state.

Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim were Himalayan states bordering India. Nepal had been recognised by the British by Nepal–Britain Treaty of 1923 as being de jure independent[124] and not a princely state. Bhutan had in the British period been considered a protectorate outside the international frontier of India.[124] The Government of India entered into a treaty with Bhutan in 1949 continuing this arrangement, and providing that Bhutan would abide by the advice of the Government of India in the conduct of its external affairs.[136] After 1947, India signed new treaties with Nepal and Bhutan.[137]

Historically, Sikkim was a British

Nepali middle classes and took a more pro-Indian view.[139]

In April 1973, anti-Chogyal agitation broke out and protestors demanded popular elections. The Sikkim police were unable to control the demonstrations, and Dorji asked India to exercise its responsibility for law and order and intervene. India facilitated negotiations between the Chogyal and Dorji, and produced an agreement, which envisaged the reduction of the Chogyal to the role of a

constitutional monarch and the holding of elections based on a new ethnic power-sharing formula.[140] The Chogyal's opponents won an overwhelming victory, and a new Constitution was drafted providing for Sikkim to be associated with the Republic of India.[141] On 10 April 1975, the Sikkim Assembly passed a resolution calling for the state to be fully integrated into India. This resolution was endorsed by 97 percent of the vote in a referendum held on 14 April 1975, following which the Indian Parliament amended the constitution to admit Sikkim into India as its 22nd state.[142]

Secessionism and sub-nationalism

While the majority of princely states absorbed into India have been fully integrated, a few outstanding issues remain. The most prominent of these is in relation to Jammu and Kashmir, where a secessionist insurgency has been raging since 1989.[143]

Some academics suggest that the insurgency is at least partly a result of the manner in which it was integrated into India. Kashmir, uniquely amongst princely states, was not required to sign either a Merger Agreement or a revised Instrument of Accession giving India control over a larger number of issues than the three originally provided for. Instead, the power to make laws relating to Kashmir was granted to the Government of India by Article 5 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and was, under Article 370 of the Constitution of India, somewhat more restricted than in relation to other states. Widmalm argues that during the 1980s, a number of Kashmiri youth began to feel that the Indian government was increasingly interfering in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir.[144] The elections of 1987 caused them to lose faith in the political process and begin the violent insurgency which is still ongoing.[144] Similarly, Ganguly suggests that the policies of the Indian government towards Kashmir meant that the state, unlike other parts of India, never developed the solid political institutions associated with a modern multi-ethnic democracy.[145] As a result, the growing dissatisfaction with the status quo felt by an increasingly politically aware youth was expressed through non-political channels[146] which Pakistan, seeking to weaken India's hold over Kashmir, transformed into an active insurgency.[147]

Separatist movements also exist in two other former princely states located in Northeast India— Tripura and

insurgencies in North-east India, rather being a result of specific problems in integrating the princely states into India, as the Kashmir problem is and, in particular, to reflect the failure of the Government of India to adequately address the aspirations of tribal groups in the Northeast, or to tackle the tensions arising from the immigration of people from other parts of India to the north-eastern areas.[148]

The integration of former princely states with other provinces to form new states has also given rise to some issues. The

Nagpur state and the Berar region of the former Hyderabad state.[150]

Critical perspectives on the process of integration

The integration process repeatedly brought Indian and Pakistani leaders into conflict. During negotiations, Jinnah, representing the Muslim League, strongly supported the right of the princely states to remain independent, joining neither India nor Pakistan, an attitude which was diametrically opposed to the stance taken by Nehru and the Congress[151] and which was reflected in Pakistan's support of Hyderabad's bid to stay independent. Post-partition, the Government of Pakistan accused India of hypocrisy on the ground that there was little difference between the accession of the ruler of Junagadh to Pakistan—which India refused to recognise—and the accession of the Maharajah of Kashmir to India, and for several years refused to recognise the legality of India's incorporation of Junagadh, treating it as de jure Pakistani territory.[73]

Different theories have been proposed to explain the designs of Indian and Pakistani leaders in this period. Rajmohan Gandhi postulates that an ideal deal working in the mind of Patel was that if Muhammad Ali Jinnah let India have Junagadh and Hyderabad, Patel would not object to Kashmir acceding to Pakistan.[152] In his book Patel: A Life, Gandhi asserts that Jinnah sought to engage the questions of Junagadh and Hyderabad in the same battle. It is suggested that he wanted India to ask for a plebiscite in Junagadh and Hyderabad, knowing thus that the principle then would have to be applied to Kashmir, where the Muslim-majority would, he believed, vote for Pakistan. A speech by Patel at the Bahauddin College in Junagadh following the latter's take-over, where he said that "we would agree to Kashmir if they agreed to Hyderabad", suggests that he may have been amenable to this idea.[153] Although Patel's opinions were not India's policy, nor were they shared by Nehru, both leaders were angered at Jinnah's courting the princes of Jodhpur, Bhopal and Indore, leading them to take a harder stance on a possible deal with Pakistan.[154]

Modern historians have also re-examined the role of the States Department and Lord Mountbatten during the accession process. Ian Copland argues that the Congress leaders did not intend the settlement contained in the Instruments of Accession to be permanent even when they were signed, and at all times privately contemplated a complete integration of the sort that ensued between 1948 and 1950.[114] He points out that the mergers and cession of powers to the Government of India between 1948 and 1950 contravened the terms of the Instruments of Accession, and were incompatible with the express assurances of internal autonomy and preservation of the princely states which Mountbatten had given the princes.[155] Menon in his memoirs stated that the changes to the initial terms of accession were in every instance freely consented to by the princes with no element of coercion. Copland disagrees, on the basis that foreign diplomats at the time believed that the princes had been given no choice but to sign, and that a few princes expressed their unhappiness with the arrangements.[156] He also criticises Mountbatten's role, saying that while he stayed within the letter of the law, he was at least under a moral obligation to do something for the princes when it became apparent that the Government of India was going to alter the terms on which accession took place, and that he should never have lent his support to the bargain given that it could not be guaranteed after independence.[157] Both Copland and Ramusack argue that, in the ultimate analysis, one of the reasons why the princes consented to the demise of their states was that they felt abandoned by the British, and saw themselves as having little other option.[158] Older historians such as Lumby, in contrast, take the view that the princely states could not have survived as independent entities after the transfer of power, and that their demise was inevitable. They therefore view successful integration of all princely states into India as a triumph for the Government of India and Lord Mountbatten, and as a tribute to the sagacity of the majority of princes, who jointly achieved in a few months what the Empire had attempted, unsuccessfully, to do for over a century—unite all of India under one rule.[159]

See also

Notes

  1. ISBN 978-0-670-09129-4. Archived
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  3. ^ Tiwari, Aaditya (30 October 2017). "Sardar Patel – Man who United India". pib.gov.in. Archived from the original on 15 November 2022. Retrieved 29 December 2022.
  4. ^ "How Vallabhbhai Patel, V P Menon and Mountbatten unified India". 31 October 2017. Archived from the original on 15 December 2022. Retrieved 29 December 2022.
  5. ^ Ramusack 2004, pp. 57–59
  6. ^ Ramusack 2004, pp. 55–56; Fisher 1984, pp. 393–428
  7. ^ Copland 1997, pp. 15–16
  8. ^ Lee-Warner 1910, pp. 48–51
  9. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 202–204
  10. ^ Ashton 1982, pp. 29–57
  11. ^ McLeod 1999, p. 66
  12. ^ Keith 1969, pp. 506–514
  13. ^ Ramusack 1978, pp. chs 1–3
  14. ^ Copland 1993, pp. 387–389
  15. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 218–219
  16. ^ Copland 1993, pp. 387–388
  17. ^ Wood et al. 1985, pp. 690–691
  18. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 214–215
  19. ^ Menon 1956, pp. 90–91.
  20. ^ Rangaswami 1981, pp. 235–246
  21. ^ Phadnis 1969, pp. 360–374
  22. ^ Ramusack 1988, pp. 378–381
  23. ^ Copland 1987, pp. 127–129
  24. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 224–225
  25. ^ Moore 1983, pp. 290–314
  26. ^ Lumby 1954, p. 204
  27. ^ Copland 1993, pp. 393–394
  28. ^ Copland 1997, p. 237
  29. ^ a b Ramusack 2004, p. 273
  30. ^ Copland 1993, p. 393; Lumby 1954, p. 232
  31. ^ Morris-Jones 1983, pp. 624–625
  32. ^ Spate 1948, pp. 15–16; Wainwright 1994, pp. 99–104
  33. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 215, 232
  34. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 226–227
  35. ^ Ramusack 2004, p. 272
  36. ^ Copland 1997, pp. 233–240
  37. ^ Lumby 1954, p. 229
  38. ^ Copland 1997, p. 244
  39. ^ Copland 1997, p. 232
  40. ^ a b c d e Copland 1997, p. 258
  41. ^ Phadnis 1968, pp. 170–171, 192–195
  42. ^ Copland 1997, pp. 253–254
  43. ^ Copland 1993, pp. 391–392
  44. ^ Copland 1997, p. 255
  45. ^ Gandhi 1991, pp. 411–412
  46. ^ Gandhi 1991, pp. 413–414
  47. ^ Copland 1993, p. 385
  48. ^ Copland 1997, p. 252
  49. ^ Eagleton 1950, p. 283
  50. ^ Moore 1983, p. 347; Lumby 1954, p. 236
  51. ^ Lumby 1954, p. 232
  52. ^ Lumby 1954, p. 228
  53. ^ a b Lumby 1954, pp. 218–219, 233
  54. ^ Brown 1984, p. 667
  55. ^ Menon 1956, pp. 99–100
  56. ^ Lumby 1954, p. 234
  57. ^ Menon 1956, pp. 109–110
  58. ^ Copland 1993, p. 399
  59. ^ Copland 1997, p. 256
  60. ^ Copland 1993, p. 396
  61. ^ Copland 1993, p. 396; Menon 1956, p. 120
  62. ^ Menon 1956, p. 114
  63. ^ Ramusack 2004, p. 274
  64. ^ a b c Copland 1997, p. 260
  65. ISSN 0971-8257
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  66. ^ Mosley 1961, p. 177
  67. ^ Menon 1956, pp. 116–117
  68. ISBN 978-81-241-0902-1
  69. ISBN 978-81-8370-110-5
    : "Maharani Kanchan Prabha Devi as President of the 'Council of Regency' signed the 'Instrument of Accession' on 13 August 1947."
  70. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 237–238
  71. ^ Lumby 1954, p. 238
  72. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 238–239
  73. ^ a b Furber 1951, p. 359
  74. ^ Menon 1956, pp. 394–395
  75. ^ a b Lumby 1954, p. 245
  76. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 245–247
  77. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 247–248
  78. ^ Potter 1950, p. 361
  79. ^ Potter 1950, pp. 361–362
  80. ^ Security Council 1957, p. 359
  81. ^ "Causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War: A Systems Level Approach". Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies. 2009. Retrieved 6 March 2024.
  82. ^ Talbot 1949, pp. 323–324
  83. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 240
  84. ^ Talbot 1949, pp. 324–325
  85. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 243–244
  86. ^ Talbot 1949, pp. 325–326
  87. ^ Puchalapalli 1973, pp. 18–42
  88. ^ Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, pp. 224
  89. ^ a b Talbot 1949, p. 325
  90. ^ Eagleton 1950, pp. 277–280
  91. ^ Gandhi 1991, p. 483
  92. ^ Thomson 2013
  93. ^ Noorani 2001
  94. ^ Talbot 1949, pp. 326–327
  95. ^ Eagleton 1950, p. 280; Talbot 1949, pp. 326–327
  96. ^ Wood 1984, p. 68
  97. ^ Furber 1951, p. 363
  98. ^ Wood 1984, p. 72
  99. ^ Furber 1951, p. 352
  100. ^ a b Copland 1997, p. 262
  101. ^ a b Menon 1956, pp. 193–194
  102. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 354–355
  103. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 355–356
  104. ^ a b Furber 1951, pp. 366–367
  105. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 354, 356
  106. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 358–359
  107. ^ Furber 1951, p. 358
  108. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 359–360
  109. ^ Furber 1951, p. 36o
  110. ^ Furber 1951, p. 361
  111. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 362–363
  112. ^ Muzaffar, H. Syed (20 February 2022). History of Indian Nation : Post-Independence India. K.K. Publications.
  113. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 367–368
  114. ^ a b c d e Copland 1997, p. 264
  115. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 357–358, 360
  116. ^ a b Furber 1951, pp. 369–370
  117. ^ Furber 1951, p. 357
  118. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 352–354
  119. ^ a b c d Copland 1997, p. 266
  120. ^ Gledhill 1957, p. 270
  121. ^ Roberts 1972, pp. 79–110
  122. ^ Furber 1951, pp. 354, 371
  123. ^ Furber 1951, p. 371
  124. ^ a b c Furber 1951, p. 369
  125. ^ Fifield 1950, p. 64
  126. ^ Vincent 1990, pp. 153–155
  127. ^ a b Karan 1960, p. 188
  128. ^ a b Fisher 1962, p. 4
  129. ^ Karan 1960, pp. 188–190
  130. ^ Fisher 1962, p. 8
  131. ^ a b Fisher 1962, p. 6
  132. ^ Fisher 1962, pp. 8–10
  133. ^ Fisher 1962, p. 10
  134. ^ Wright 1962, p. 619
  135. ^ "Goa, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act, 1987". 23 May 1987.
  136. ^ Fifield 1952, pp. 450
  137. ^ "The India-China Competition in the Himalayas: Nepal and Bhutan". ISPI. Retrieved 6 March 2024.
  138. ^ Furber 1951, p. 369; Note 1975, p. 884
  139. ^ Gupta 1975, pp. 789–790
  140. ^ Gupta 1975, pp. 790–793
  141. ^ Gupta 1975, pp. 793–795
  142. ^ Note 1975, p. 884
  143. ^ Zutshi 2017, p. 123
  144. ^ a b Widmalm 1997, pp. 1019–1023
  145. ^ Ganguly 1996, pp. 99–101
  146. ^ Ganguly 1996, pp. 91–105
  147. ^ Ganguly 1996, p. 103
  148. ^ See e.g. Hardgrave 1983, pp. 1173–1177; Guha 1984, pp. 42–65; Singh 1987, pp. 263–264
  149. ^ Gray 1971, pp. 463–474
  150. ^ Mitra 2006, p. 133
  151. ^ Menon 1956, pp. 86–87
  152. ^ Gandhi 1991, pp. 430–438
  153. ^ Gandhi 1991, p. 438
  154. ^ Gandhi 1991, pp. 407–408
  155. ^ Copland 1993, pp. 399–401
  156. ^ Copland 1997, pp. 266, 271–272
  157. ^ Copland 1993, pp. 398–401
  158. ^ Ramusack 2004, p. 274; Copland 1997, pp. 355–356
  159. ^ Lumby 1954, pp. 218; Furber 1951, p. 359

Sources

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