1947 Poonch rebellion
1947 Poonch rebellion | |||||||
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Part of the Kashmir conflict | |||||||
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Supported by: Pakistan |
Jammu and Kashmir State Forces | ||||||
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Indo-Pakistani war of 1947-1948 | ||||||
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In spring 1947, an uprising against the Maharaja
Background
After the death of Raja Jagatdev Singh of Poonch in 1940, Maharaja Hari Singh appointed a chosen guardian for his minor son, Shiv Ratandev Singh, and used the opportunity to integrate the Poonch jagir into the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Poonch came to be administered by the officers of Jammu and Kashmir as a district of the
The Poonchis had a tradition of military service. During the Second World War, over 60,000 Muslims from the Poonch and Mirpur districts enrolled in the British Indian Army.[2][b] After the war, many of them retained their arms while returning.[6] The Maharaja did not (or could not) absorb them into the State forces.[c] The absence of employment prospects coupled with high taxation caused displeasure among the Poonchis in 1947.[5]
The context of Partition
At the beginning of 1947, the
On 2 March 1947, the Unionist government in Punjab fell. Immediately, communal fires were set ablaze in
The Pir of Manki Sharif was also reported to have sent agents provocateurs to the frontier districts of Kashmir to prepare their Muslims for a 'holy crusade'.[14] Kashmir responded by sealing the border with the provinces, and sending more troops to the border areas. The stream of Hindu and Sikh refugees coming from the Rawalpindi and Hazara districts also spread unease in the State. Drivers refused to use the Srinagar–Rawalpindi road because of reports of disturbances and raids.[14][d]
Possibly as a result of the defensive measures, the Poonch district came to be militarised.
Political environment in the State
The Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir were organised under two political parties: the
The Hindus, who were mostly confined to the Jammu province, were organised under Rajya Hindu Sabha led by Prem Nath Dogra, and were allied to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. The Jammu Hindus generally regarded the Maharaja as their natural leader and gave him total support.[20]
Unrest prior to Partition
Spring 1947
Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan of the Bagh tehsil[f] is credited with instigating the Poonchis of Bagh and Sudhnoti tehsils in February 1947 not to pay the 'excessive taxes' demanded by the State.[21][22] This eventually came to be called a 'no tax' campaign.[2][23] Towards the end of June, the State troops in Poonch ran out of rations and demanded the local populace to provide their supplies. When the populace eventually declared their inability to do so, the Revenue Minister of the State came down to Poonch to collect the tax arrears. This led to renewed repression.[24]
By the end of July, the Government had clamped
August 1947
Sometime in August 1947, the first signs of trouble broke out in
According to state government sources, the demobilised soldiers were moved by the state government's failure to pay them remunerations promised by New Delhi. Rebellious militias gathered in the Palandri–Nowshera–Anantnag area, attacking the state troops and their supply trucks. The state troops were at this time thinly spread escorting refugees between India and Pakistan. A reserve battalion of Sikh troops was dispatched to Poonch, which cleared the roads and dispersed the militias. It also cut off Poonch from Pakistan by sealing the Jhelum river bridge for fear that the Pakistanis might come to aid the Poonch militias.
On the other hand, the Muslim Conference sources narrate that hundreds of people were killed in
According to the Assistant British High Commissioner in northern Pakistan, H. S. Stephenson, "the Poonch affair... was greatly exaggerated".[34] The state's army chief H. L. Scott's report on 31 August states that the army action targeted persons known or suspected of "rioting, looting, murder or inciting", but "exaggerated reports of events in Poonch circulated in these Pakistan districts in which State troops are cited as the aggressors."[38] Scholar Srinath Raghavan states that, after the protests turned violent, the state carried out a "brutal crackdown" and the developing revolt was quickly "snuffed out".[39]
Politics of accession
With the impending independence of India and Pakistan in August 1947, the Maharaja indicated his preference to remain independent of the new dominions. All the major political groups of the state supported the Maharaja's decision, except for the Muslim Conference, which eventually declared in favour of accession to Pakistan on 19 July 1947, after its earlier hesitations.[40] The Muslim Conference was popular in the Jammu province of the state, with especial strength in the Poonch and Mirpur districts. It was closely allied with the All-India Muslim League, which was set to inherit Pakistan.
By the time of the independence of the new dominions, it is said that, many people in Poonch were identifying themselves with Pakistan. They reportedly raised Pakistan flags and supported the Muslim Conference's pro-Pakistan stance.[31] Several Muslim officers of the State Army had conspired to overthrow the Maharaja's government on 14 August 1947. Chief among them was Captain Mirza Hassan Khan posted at Bhimber (Mirpur district), who claimed to have been elected as the chairman of a "revolutionary council".[41] Major General Henry Lawrence Scott, the State's Army Chief, transferred the officers to new posts prior to that date, which foiled their attempts.[42]
Scholar Srinath Raghavan states that the "gathering head of steam" in Poonch was utilised by the local Muslim Conference led by
Towards the end of August, Muslim League activists from Pakistan joined to strengthen the protests.[39] General Scott's report on 4 September stated that 500 hostile tribesmen in green and khaki uniforms entered Poonch and they were joined by 200–300 Sattis from Kahuta and Murree. Their purpose appeared to be to loot the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the district. Scott lodged a protest with the British commander of the Pakistan's 7th Infantry Division and the Government of Kashmir also followed it up with request to Government of Pakistan to prevent the raids.[44]
Scholar Prem Shankar Jha states that the Maharaja had decided, as early as April 1947, that he would accede to India if it was not possible to stay independent.[45]: 115 The rebellion in Poonch possibly unnerved the Maharaja. Accordingly, on 11 August, he dismissed his pro-Pakistan Prime Minister,[46] Ram Chandra Kak, and appointed a pro-India,[47] retired Major Janak Singh in his place. On 25 August, he sent an invitation to Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, with known ties to the Indian National Congress, to come as the Prime Minister.[48] On the same day, the Muslim Conference wrote to the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan warning him that "if, God forbid, the Pakistan Government or the Muslim League do not act, Kashmir might be lost to them".[49] The acting president Chaudhry Hamidullah sent word to the NWFP premier, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, to arrange for the Kashmir borders to be attacked from Pakistan to draw out State Forces, so that the Poonch rebels can advance to Srinagar.[50]
Jha believes that the Maharaja made up his mind to accede to India around 10 September, as reported by the
Entry of Pakistan (September 1947)
At the end of August, Sardar Ibrahim had escaped to West Punjab, along with dozens of rebels, and established a base in
Before settling to work in Murree, Sardar Ibrahim went to Lahore to seek the help of Pakistan. Jinnah refused to see him, for he did not wish to be involved in the happenings of the state at that time. However, Ibrahim was able to get the attention of Mian Iftikharuddin, a Punjab politician serving as the Minister for Refugee Rehabilitation. Ibrahim told him that the Muslims of Kashmir were facing grave danger from the Maharaja's administration and they needed Pakistan's help. Iftikhar promised to make enquiries.[54] According to other accounts, Iftikharuddin was "deputed" to go to Srinagar and explore Pakistan's prospects for Kashmir's accession.[39][55]
On his way to Kashmir, Iftikharuddin stopped in Murree and met Colonel Akbar Khan, one of a handful of high-ranking Pakistani military officers, who was vacationing in the hill station. According to Akbar Khan's account, Iftikharuddin asked him to prepare a plan for action by Pakistan in case he was to find the political situation in Kashmir unpromising. He told him, however, that the action had to be "unofficial" in nature and not involve the senior British officers in the Army.[56]
Sardar Ibrahim found his way to Akbar Khan and requested arms from the military. Ibrahim thought that "the time for peaceful negotiations was gone because every protest was being met with repressions and, therefore, in certain areas the people were virtually in a state of revolt...if they were to protect themselves and to prevent the Maharaja from handing them over to India, they needed weapons." The quantity of weapons requested was 500 rifles.[52]
Akbar Khan discussed the issues with Ibrahim and others, and returned to Rawalpindi to develop a plan. Titled Armed Revolt inside Kashmir, his plan involved diverting to the Poonch rebels, 4000 rifles which were being given by the Army to the Punjab police. Condemned ammunition, scheduled to be discarded, would be diverted to the rebels. Colonel Azam Khanzada, in charge of the Army stores, promised cooperation. The plan strategised for irregular warfare, assuming that 2000 Muslim troops of the State Army (out of a total 9000) would join the rebels. It proposed that, in addition, former officers of the Indian National Army (INA) be used to provide military leadership to the rebels. The armed action was to focus on severing the road and air links between Kashmir and India (the road link near Jammu and the airport at Srinagar). Akbar Khan made 12 copies of his plan and gave it to Mian Iftikharuddin, who returned from Kashmir with the assessment that the National Conference held strong and it did not support accession to Pakistan.[57]
12 September meeting
On 12 September, the Pakistan Prime Minister held a meeting with Mian Iftikharuddin, Colonel Akbar Khan, West Punjab Minister
Another meeting was called around 20 September, to which the Muslim Conference leaders Chaudhry Hamidullah and Muhammad Ishaque Khan were summoned from Srinagar. This meeting was also attended by
GHQ Azad
By 23 September, General Kiani established a headquarters at
By 2 October, Col. Kiani, in charge of the Sialkot sector, started operations south of
Operation Gulmarg
According to Indian military sources, the Pakistani Army prepared a plan called
The regimental records show that, by the last week of August, the
Rebellion (October 1947)
Muslim Conference leaders proclaimed a provisional
On or around 6 October, the armed rebellion started in the Poonch district.[84][85] The fighting elements consisted of "bands of deserters from the State Army, serving soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave, ex-servicemen, and other volunteers who had risen spontaneously."[63] The rebels quickly gained control of almost the entire Poonch district. The State Forces garrison at Poonch came under heavy siege.[86]
In the Mirpur district, the border posts at Saligram and Owen Pattan on Jhelum river were captured by rebels around 8 October.
On 21 October, the Pakistani Army's public relations officer issued a press release to the API about the impending Pashtun tribal invasion, but instructed that the news be published as coming from the Azad Kashmir headquarters at Pallandri.[81][82] On the night of 21 October, Khurshid Anwar crossed into Jammu and Kashmir near Muzaffarabad, heading a lashkar of 4,000 Pashtun tribesmen.[88] In the next few days the tribal force swelled to over 12,000 men.[89] Facing an impending collapse, the Maharaja acceded to the Indian Union, following which India air-lifted troops to defend Srinagar on 27 October. From this point on the tribal invasion and the Poonch rebellion proceeded in parallel.
On 27 October, a Kashmir Liberation Committee was established, headed by the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Colonel Akbar Khan, as the military member, and Sardar Ibrahim, as the representative of Azad Kashmir were included, as were the finance officer Ghulam Mohammad and a political officer Major Yusuf. The 'GHQ Azad' of General Kiani was asked to report to this committee.[90] In due course, Justice Din Muhammad, a retired judge of the Lahore High Court, was appointed as a "trusted agent" of the Pakistan government to liaise with the Azad Kashmir government, who also doubled as the chair of the Liberation Committee.[91]
The PAVO Cavalry commanded by Col. "Tommy" Masud was now called into action. Under the cover of the rebellion, the regiment attacked the border town of Bhimber with armoured cars during the night of 23 October. The town, guarded by only a company of Dogra troops, supported by half-trained civilians of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), easily succumbed. In the morning, the Azad rebels moved in and looted the town, possibly organised by INA personnel. After the fall of the fort, the PAVO Cavalry withdrew to their base and allowed the rebels to take the credit.[92][o]
Rebels gained momentum after the fall of Bhimber. On 7 November, Rajouri was captured.[93] The remaining garrisons of State Forces at Mirpur, Jhangar, Kotli and Poonch were surrounded.
Analysis
Jammu political activist and journalist
Scholar Christopher Snedden noted that the Jammu massacres motivated some Muslims to join the movement against Maharaja, for self-defence.[96] He also remarked:[1]
"The reaction of the ruler’s predominantly Hindu army to Poonch Muslims’ pro-Pakistan activities boosted the anti-Maharaja ‘cause’ in Poonch and incited Poonchis to take further action. In response to incidents around Poonch that invariably involved Muslims, the Maharaja’s army fired on crowds, burned houses and villages indiscriminately, plundered, arrested people, and imposed local martial law. Indeed, because ‘trouble continued … the State forces were compelled to deal with it with a heavy hand’. Until such oppressive actions, the anti-Maharaja cause probably had little backing. ‘Substantial men’ told Symonds that ‘they would never have joined such a rash enterprise’ opposing the Maharaja ‘but for the folly of the Dogras who burnt whole villages where only a single family was involved in the revolt’. Such ‘folly’ motivated some Poonch Muslims to organise a people’s resistance movement."
Referring to the events in Poonch, Sheikh Abdullah, according to a New Delhi report circulated by the Associated Press of India, on 21 October said:[94]
The present troubles in Poonch, a feudatory of Kashmir, were because of the policy adopted by the State. The people of Poonch who suffered under the local ruler, and his overlord, the Kashmir durbar, had started a people’s movement to redress their grievances. It was not communal. The Kashmir State sent their troops and there was panic in Poonch. Most of the adult population in Poonch was ex-servicemen of the Indian Army, who had close connections with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, crossed the frontier and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The Kashmir State forces were thus forced to withdraw from certain areas.
Aftermath
After the Indian forces entered the war, Pakistan officially intervened subsequently.
According to scholar Ian Copland, the Jammu massacres were undertaken by the administration against the Muslims in Jammu, partly out of revenge for the Poonch uprising.[2]
Many Hindus and Sikhs, on and after 25 November 1947 gathered in
See also
- 1955 Poonch uprising
- History of Poonch District
- History of Azad Kashmir
- Azad Kashmir
- Jammu and Kashmir (princely state)
- Kashmir conflict
- Siege of Skardu
- Operation Datta Khel
Notes
- Treaty of Amritsar, 1846, Gulab Singh, who became the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, reinstated these territories as jagirs to Dhyan Singh's sons. While Mirpur was subsequently absorbed by Gulab Singh, Poonch remained with the descendants of Dhyan Singh until 1940.
- ^ 60,000 Muslims from Poonch and Mirpur, were out of a total of nearly 72,000 citizens who enrolled from the entire princely state.[5]
- ^ Jammu and Kashmir State Forces had 9 battalions numbering 9,000 men. Absorbing even a small fraction of the ex-servicemen into the forces would have been a tall order.
- ^ Jha, The Origins of a Dispute (2003), p. 15: "Webb [the British Resident in Kashmir] had reported that Basian and Phagwari, two villages in the Murree hills in Punjab that were inhabited by Hindus and Sikhs which were less than 10 miles from the Kohala border, had been burned. The burning houses could be seen for miles and had triggered the flight of around 200 refugees belonging to the two communities across the Kohala Bridge into Kashmir. This had spread uneasiness in Kashmir province. The state government had dispatched a large number of state troops to Kohala and Ramkot on the Domel Abbottabad road to ensure that the armed raiders did not cross the border."
- ^ According to the State sources, the so-called "Poonch Brigade" was put together from the existing battalions of the State forces. However, to police the long border, a number of "garrison police companies" were raised and equipped from "ancient stocks" of weaponry.[17] Lord Birdwood mentions the figure of new companies as twelve. They were all non-Muslim.[18]
- ^ Abdul Qayyum Khan was a twenty-three year old local landlord, who returned from having served in the British Indian Army. During World War II, he served in North Africa and the Middle East and imbibed some of the Muslim ideology of the area. He played a crucial role in the Poonch Rebellion and subsequently became the President of Azad Kashmir in 1956.
- ^ Under the Jammu and Kashmir Arms Act of 1940, the possession of all fire arms was prohibited in the state. The Dogra Rajputs were however exempted from this restriction.[29]
- ^ Though the disarming started in some villages during July–August, it was systematically done in many places only in September.[30]
- ^ Jha, The Origins of a Dispute 2003, pp. 18–19: "Gen. Scott, the commander of state forces, was at pains to point out that their main purpose was to air, local grievances, mainly the high prices of foodstuffs. The distress of the people was not surprising. As Webb had reported from Srinagar at the time, the winter of 1946–47 had been unusually severe, and had caused food shortages and pushed up prices. Add to that the disruption of supplies that had taken place in spring and summer because of the communal violence in Punjab, and it was hardly surprising that the people of Poonch, as elsewhere in Kashmir, were in considerable distress."
- Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, or Sardar Ibrahim, was the elected representative of the Poonch district in the State's Legislative Assembly and a Muslim Conference leader. According to Josef Korbel, he traveled throughout the State, arousing the spirit of the people since June 1947, and narrowly escaped arrest in Srinagar in August.[43]
- ^ According to scholar Shams Rehman, "if we accept the claims by such writers as Zahir Ud Din, it appears that indeed it was formed under the instructions of Pakistan government to oust Maharaja and take Kashmir like India took Junagarh. A closer look at the details of Junagarh case supports the claim made here that the Azad Kashmir government of 4th October that was reorganized on 24th October in fact was set up by Pakistan in reaction to the provisional government of Junagarh declared on 25th of September 1947."[74]
- ^ Other members of the provisional government were Ghulam Haider Jandalvi, the minister for defence; Nazir Hussain Shah, the minister for finance; and two other ministers for education and industry under assumed names.[75]
- ^ Other members of this government were Sayid Ali Ahmed Shah, Chaudhri Abdullah Khan Bhalli, Khwaja Ghulam Din Wani, Sayid Nazir Husain Shah and Sonna Ullah Shah.[78]
- ^ Sardar Ibrahim narrates that he was woken up in the dead of night on 23 October by the Divisional Commissioner of Rawalpindi, Khawaja Abdul Rahim, and told that it had become necessary to reconstitute the government with himself as the president.[79][80]
- ^ Joshi, Kashmir, 1947–1965: A Story Retold (2008), pp. 59–: "The unit was also directly involved in capturing Bhimber. The account [of the PAVO Cavalry] makes it clear that the alleged role of locals, armed with lathis, was only a fig-leaf. The actual attack was carried out by the Pakistani regulars, led by its commanding officer Tommy Masud on October 22 night and after eliminating the lone J&K State forces company, they quietly withdrew and left the area in the hands of the ex-INA personnel."
- ^ Ibrahim Khan, Muhammad (1990), The Kashmir Saga, Verinag, p. 55: During the month of November 1947, I went to Mirpur to see things there for myself. I visited, during the night, one Hindu refugee camp at Ali Baig—about 15 miles from Mirpur proper. Among the refugees I found some of my fellow lawyers in a pathetic condition. I saw them myself, sympathised with them and solemnly promised that they would be rescued and sent to Pakistan, from where they would eventually be sent out to India.... After a couple of days, when I visited the camp again to do my bit for them, I was greatly shocked to learn that all those people whom I had seen on the last occasion had been disposed of. I can only say that nothing in my life pained my conscience so much as did this incident.... Those who were in charge of those camps were duly dealt with but that certainly is no compensation to those whose near and dear ones were killed.
Citations
- ^ a b c d Snedden, Christopher. "The forgotten Poonch uprising of 1947". India-seminar.
- ^ a b c d e Copland, State, Community and Neighbourhood in Princely North India (2005), p. 143.
- ^ Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), pp. 30–31; Ankit, The Problem of Poonch (2010), p. 8
- ^ Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), pp. 237–238; McLeod, India and Pakistan: Friends, Rivals or Enemies? (2008), pp. 74–75; Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict (2003), p. 41
- ^ a b Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict (2003), p. 41.
- ^ Moore, Making the new Commonwealth (1987), p. 48.
- ISBN 978-0-312-21606-1
- ^ Hiro, The Longest August (2015), Chapter 6.
- ^ Rajmohan Gandhi, Ghaffar Khan (2008), pp. 171–172, 224.
- ^ Jha, The Origins of a Dispute (2003), p. 61, 170.
- ISBN 978-1-134-59937-0
- ISBN 978-0-89089-277-0
- ^ Rajmohan Gandhi, Ghaffar Khan (2008), pp. 170–171.
- ^ a b Jha, The Origins of a Dispute (2003), p. 15.
- ^ Copland, The Abdullah Factor (1991), pp. 243–244.
- ^ a b Suharwardy, Tragedy in Kashmir (1983), pp. 100–102.
- ^ Palit, Jammu and Kashmir Arms (1972), p. 151.
- ^ Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir (1956), p. 212.
- ^ Copland, The Abdullah Factor (1991); Zutshi, Languages of Belonging (2004), p. 302; Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir (2007), pp. 23, 28
- ^ Puri, Balraj (November 2010), "The Question of Accession", Epilogue, 4 (11): 4–5
- ^ Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), pp. 41–42.
- ^ Khān, Abdulqayyūm (1992), The Kashmir case, S.A.A. Khan, pp. 1–2
- ^ Beg, Aziz (1986), Jinnah and His Times: A Biography, Babur & Amer Publications: "The first official mention of this occurs in a Press note of the Kashmir Government which states that 'early in August in Bagh Tehsil and northern part of Sudh Nutti Tehsil of Poonch Jagir, evilly disposed persons launched a violent agitation against the administration of the jagir and in favour of civil disobedience and no-tax campaign...'"
- ^ Suharwardy, Tragedy in Kashmir (1983), p. 102, 103.
- ^ Ibrahim Khan, The Kashmir Saga (1990), p. 57.
- ^ Suharwardy, Tragedy in Kashmir (1983), p. 102; Ibrahim Khan, The Kashmir Saga (1990), pp. 57–58
- ^ Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2 (2015), p. 83.
- ^ Suharwardy, Tragedy in Kashmir (1983), p. 103; Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict (2003), p. 41
- ISBN 978-81-7625-514-1
- ^ Jha, Rival Versions of History (1996), pp. 23–24.
- ^ a b Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), p. 41.
- ^ Ibrahim Khan, The Kashmir Saga (1990), p. 58.
- ^ Jha, Rival Versions of History (1996), Chapters 1–2.
- ^ a b Ankit, The Problem of Poonch (2010), p. 9.
- ^ Ankit, Henry Scott (2010), p. 47.
- ^ Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), p. 42.
- ^ Nawaz, The First Kashmir War Revisited (2008), p. 119.
- ^ Government of India, White Paper on Jammu & Kashmir (1948), p. 2.
- ^ a b c d Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 105.
- ^ Puri, Balraj (November 2010), "The Question of Accession", Epilogue, 4 (11): 4–6,
Eventually they agreed on a modified resolution which 'respectfully and fervently appealed to the Maharaja Bahadur to declare internal autonomy of the State... and accede to the Dominion of Pakistan... However, the General Council did not challenge the maharaja's right to take a decision on accession, and it acknowledged that his rights should be protected even after acceding to Pakistan.
- ^ Dani, History of Northern Areas of Pakistan (2001), pp. 338, 366: "Hasan Khan and Major Mohammad Afzal Khan agreed that the Dogra regime should be toppled in Kashmir. Later they contacted Captain Mohammad Mansha Khan, Major Mohammad Sher Kiyani, Major Sayyid Ghazanfar Ali Shah and Major Mohammad Din in Srinagar. They all agreed to support the proposal. Later Major Mohammad Aslam Khan was also contacted and was entrusted to work in Jammu... Then a military council was set up and the members vowed to act simultaneously by attacking and occupying military cantonments on 14th August 1947."
- ^ Dani, History of Northern Areas of Pakistan (2001), p. 366.
- ISBN 9781400875238
- ^ Jha, Rival Versions of History (1996), p. 23.
- ^ Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris (2015), p. 155.
- ^ Ankit, Henry Scott (2010), p. 45, 47, 49.
- ^ Jha, Rival Versions of History (1996), p. 44; Jha, The Origins of a Dispute (2003), p. 46
- ^ Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 103, 106.
- ^ Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2 (2015), p. 85.
- ^ Jha, Rival Versions of History 1996, pp. 47–48; Jha, The Origins of a Dispute 2003, p. 50: "On 26 September, the Pakistan Times, whose owner was ... a prominent member of the Muslim League, published a report on its front page, datelined Srinagar, stating that 'Kashmir has decided to join the Indian Union'. Its Srinagar correspondent said that the decision had been taken two weeks earlier. The report, which appeared almost speculative at the time, was almost entirely accurate."
- ^ a b Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 105–106; Nawaz, The First Kashmir War Revisited (2008), pp. 119–120
- ^ Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), p. 44.
- ^ Ibrahim Khan, The Kashmir Saga (1990), pp. 68–70.
- ^ Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (2007), p. 115.
- ^ Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 105; Nawaz, The First Kashmir War Revisited (2008), pp. 119–120
- ISBN 9788187943525
- ^ Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 105–106; Nawaz, The First Kashmir War Revisited (2008), p. 120
- ^ Jha, The Origins of a Dispute (2003), p. 30; Effendi, Punjab Cavalry (2007), p. 152
- ^ Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2 (2015), p. 149.
- ^ Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2 (2015), pp. 148–150.
- ^ Khan, Aamer Ahmed (1994), "Look Back in Anger", The Herald, Volume 25, Pakistan Herald Publications, p. 54
- ^ a b Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (1998), p. 113.
- ^ Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2 (2015), p. 172–173.
- ^ Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2 (2015), p. 173.
- ^ Palit, Jammu and Kashmir Arms (1972), p. 246.
- ^ Prasad & Pal, Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1987), pp. 17–19.
- ^ Kalkat, Onkar S. (1983), The Far-flung Frontiers, Allied Publishers, pp. 40–42
- ^ Moore, Making the new Commonwealth (1987), p. 49.
- ^ Effendi, Punjab Cavalry (2007), pp. 151–153.
- ^ Joshi, Kashmir, 1947–1965: A Story Retold (2008), p. 59–.
- ISBN 978-1516850235
- ^ Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), p. 58; Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (2003), p. 100
- ^ Rehman, Shams (31 July 2013), "Azad Kashmir Government: Birth and Growth", Shabir Choudhry blogspot
- ^ Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (2012), p. 233.
- ^ Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (2012); Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), p. 59
- ^ Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), p. 61; Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (2012), p. 234; Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (1998), pp. 112–113
- ^ Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (2012), p. 234.
- ^ Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (1998), pp. 112–113.
- ISBN 978-1-4918-7788-3
- ^ a b
Singh, Brigadier Jasbir (2013). Roar of the Tiger: Illustrated History of Operations in Kashmir by 4th Battalion. Vij Books India. pp. 4–5. ISBN 978-9382652038.
- ^ a b
Kapoor, Sindhu (2014), "7", Politics of Protests in Jammu and Kashmir from 1925 to 1951, University of Jammu/Shodhganga, p. 325, hdl:10603/78307
- ^ Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (1998), p. 112.
- ^ ul-Hassan, Syed Minhaj (2015), "Qaiyum Khan and the War of Kashmir, 1947–48 AD." (PDF), FWU Journal of Social Sciences, 9 (1): 1–7
- S2CID 144787951
- ^ Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (2003), p. 100; Copland, State, Community and Neighbourhood in Princely North India (2005), p. 143
- ^ Cheema, Crimson Chinar (2015), p. 57; Palit, Jammu and Kashmir Arms (1972), p. 162
- ^ Jha, Rival Versions of History (1996), p. 25; Jha, The Origins of a Dispute (2003), p. 25
- ^ Jha, Rival Versions of History (1996), p. 26; Jha, The Origins of a Dispute (2003), p. 27
- ^ Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (1998), p. 105.
- ^ Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (1998), p. 114.
- ^ Effendi, Punjab Cavalry (2007), pp. 156–157; Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2 (2015), pp. 247–248
- ^ V. K. Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army (2005), p. 160.
- ^ a b Bhasin, Ved (17 November 2015). "Jammu 1947". Kashmir Life.
- ^ Jamwal, Anuradha Bhasin (January 2005), "Prejudice in Paradise", Communalism Combat, vol. 11
- ^ Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), pp. 48, 58.
- ^ Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History (2013), p. 56; Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (2012), p. 97; Hasan, Mirpur 1947 (2013)
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