Foreign policy of the Gerald Ford administration
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Pre-vice presidency
40th Vice President of the United States
38th President of the United States
Policies
Appointments
Tenure
Presidential campaign Post-presidency
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The
However, Ford's foreign policy was also marked by setbacks. The fall of South Vietnam in 1975 was a blow to US credibility and influence in the world. He presided over the final stages of the Vietnam War, announcing in April 1975 that U.S. participation in the war had ended. In the aftermath of the war, his administration responded forcefully to both the Mayaguez incident and an incident with North Korea in Panmunjom.
The US also faced challenges in the Middle East, with the 1973 oil crisis and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, the Ford administration facilitated completion of the Sinai Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt.
Leadership
Appointments
Upon assuming office, Ford inherited Nixon's
Cold War
Ford continued Nixon's
Despite the collapse of the trade agreement with the Soviet Union, Ford and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev continued the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which had begun under Nixon. In 1972, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had reached the SALT I treaty, which placed upper limits on each power's nuclear arsenal.[7] Ford met Brezhnev at the November 1974 Vladivostok Summit, at which point the two leaders agreed to a framework for another SALT treaty.[8] Opponents of détente, led by Jackson, delayed Senate consideration of the treaty until after Ford left office.[9]
Helsinki Accords
When Ford took office in August 1974, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations had been underway in
In the months leading up to the conclusion of negotiations and signing of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, Americans of Eastern European descent voiced their concerns that the agreement would mean the acceptance of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and the permanent incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR.[11] Shortly before President Ford departed for Helsinki, he held a meeting with a delegation of Americans of Eastern European background, and stated definitively that US policy on the Baltic States would not change, but would be strengthened since the agreement denies the annexation of territory in violation of international law and allows for the peaceful change of borders. he told the delegation that:
- The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between peoples of East and West. ... We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights. ... If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better, and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far."[12]
His reassurances had little effect. The volume of negative mail continued to grow.[13] The American public was still unconvinced that American policy on the incorporation of the Baltic States would not be changed by the Helsinki Final Act. Despite protests from all around, Ford decided to move forward and sign the agreement.[14] As domestic criticism mounted, Ford hedged on his support for the Helsinki Accords, which had the impact of overall weakening his foreign-policy stature. His blunder in the debate with Carter when he denied Kremlin control of Poland prove disastrous.[15]
Though Ford was criticized for his apparent recognition of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, the new emphasis on human rights would eventually contribute to the weakening of the
Vietnam
One of Ford's greatest challenges was dealing with the ongoing Vietnam War. American offensive operations against North Vietnam had ended with the
Fighting in Vietnam continued after the withdrawal of most U.S. forces in early 1973.
With the North Vietnamese forces advancing on the South Vietnamese capital of
The Vietnam War, which had raged since the 1950s, finally came to an end with the Fall of Saigon, and Vietnam was reunified into one country. Many of the Vietnamese evacuees were allowed to enter the United States under the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. The 1975 act appropriated $455 million toward the costs of assisting the settlement of Indochinese refugees.[24] In all, 130,000 Vietnamese refugees came to the United States in 1975. Thousands more escaped in the years that followed.[25] Following the end of the war, Ford expanded the embargo of North Vietnam to cover all of Vietnam, blocked Vietnam's accession to the United Nations, and refused to establish full diplomatic relations.[26]
Mayaguez and Panmunjom
North Vietnam's victory over the South led to a considerable shift in the political winds in Asia, and Ford administration officials worried about a consequent loss of U.S. influence in the region. The administration proved it was willing to respond forcefully to challenges to its interests in the region on two occasions, once when Khmer Rouge forces seized an American ship in international waters and again when American military officers were killed in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North Korea and South Korea.[27]
In May 1975, shortly after the fall of Saigon and the Khmer Rouge conquest of Cambodia, Cambodians seized the American merchant ship Mayaguez in international waters, sparking what became known as the Mayaguez incident.[28] Ford dispatched Marines to rescue the crew, but the Marines landed on the wrong island and met unexpectedly stiff resistance just as, unknown to the U.S., the Mayaguez sailors were being released. In the operation, two military transport helicopters carrying the Marines for the assault operation were shot down, and 41 U.S. servicemen were killed and 50 wounded while approximately 60 Khmer Rouge soldiers were killed.[29] Despite American losses, the rescue operation proved to be a boon to Ford's poll numbers; Senator Barry Goldwater declared that the operation "shows we've still got balls in this country."[30] Some historians have argued that the Ford administration felt the need to respond forcefully to the incident because it was construed as a Soviet plot.[31] But work by Andrew Gawthorpe, published in 2009, based on an analysis of the administration's internal discussions, shows that Ford's national security team understood that the seizure of the vessel was a local, and perhaps even accidental, provocation by an immature Khmer government. Nevertheless, they felt the need to respond forcefully to discourage further provocations by other Communist countries in Asia.[32]
A second crisis, known as the
Middle East
In the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, two ongoing international disputes developed into crises during Ford's presidency. The
In 1973, Egypt and Syria had launched a joint surprise attack against Israel, seeking to re-take land lost in the Six-Day War of 1967. However, early Arab success gave way to an Israel military victory in what became known as the Yom Kippur War. Although an initial cease fire had been implemented to end active conflict in the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger's continuing shuttle diplomacy was showing little progress. Ford disliked what he saw as Israeli "stalling" on a peace agreement, and wrote, "[Israeli] tactics frustrated the Egyptians and made me mad as hell."[37] During Kissinger's shuttle to Israel in early March 1975, a last minute reversal to consider further withdrawal, prompted a cable from Ford to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, which included:
I wish to express my profound disappointment over Israel's attitude in the course of the negotiations ... Failure of the negotiation will have a far reaching impact on the region and on our relations. I have given instructions for a reassessment of United States policy in the region, including our relations with Israel, with the aim of ensuring that overall American interests ... are protected. You will be notified of our decision.[38]
On March 24, Ford informed congressional leaders of both parties of the reassessment of the administration policies in the Middle East. "Reassessment", in practical terms, meant canceling or suspending further aid to Israel. For six months between March and September 1975, the United States refused to conclude any new arms agreements with Israel. Rabin notes it was "an innocent-sounding term that heralded one of the worst periods in American-Israeli relations".[39] The announced reassessments upset many American supporters of Israel. On May 21, Ford "experienced a real shock" when seventy-six U.S. senators wrote him a letter urging him to be "responsive" to Israel's request for $2.59 billion in military and economic aid. Ford felt truly annoyed and thought the chance for peace was jeopardized. It was, since the September 1974 ban on arms to Turkey, the second major congressional intrusion upon the President's foreign policy prerogatives.[40] The following summer months were described by Ford as an American-Israeli "war of nerves" or "test of wills".[41] After much bargaining, the Sinai Interim Agreement (Sinai II) between Egypt and Israel was formally signed, and aid resumed.[citation needed]
Angola
A civil war broke out Angola after the fledgling African nation gained independence from Portugal in 1975. The Soviet Union and Cuba both became heavily involved in the conflict, backing the left-wing MPLA, one of the major factions in the civil war. In response, the CIA directed aid to two other factions in the war, UNITA and the FNLA. After members of Congress learned of the CIA operation, Congress voted to cut off aid to the Angolan groups. The Angolan Civil War would continue in subsequent years, but the Soviet role in the war hindered détente. Congress's role in ending the CIA presence marked the growing power of the legislative branch in foreign affairs.[42]
Indonesia
U.S. policy since the 1940s has been to support Indonesia, which hosted American investments in petroleum and raw materials and controlled a highly strategic location near vital shipping lanes. In 1975, the left-wing Fretilin party seized power after a civil war in East Timor (now Timor-Leste), a former colony of Portugal that shared the island of Timor with the Indonesian region of West Timor. Indonesian leaders feared that East Timor would serve as a hostile left-wing base that would promote secessionist movements inside Indonesia.[43] Anti-Fretilin activists from the other main parties fled to West Timor and called upon Indonesia to annex East Timor and end the communist threat. On December 7, 1975, Ford and Kissinger met Indonesian President Suharto in Jakarta and indicated the United States would not take a position on East Timor. Indonesia invaded the next day, and took control of the country. The United Nations, with U.S. support, called for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces. A bloody civil war broke out, and over one hundred thousand died in the fighting or from executions or starvation. Upwards of half of the population of East Timor became refugees fleeing Fretilin-controlled areas. East Timor took two decades to settle down, and finally, after international intervention in the 1999 East Timorese crisis, East Timor became an independent nation in 2002.[44][45]
Other issues
Ford attended the inaugural meeting of the
List of international trips
Ford made seven international trips during his presidency.[47]
Dates | Country | Locations | Details | |
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1 | October 21, 1974 | Mexico | Nogales, Magdalena de Kino
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Met with President Padre Eusebio Kino .
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2 | November 19–22, 1974 | Japan | Tokyo, Kyoto |
State visit. Met with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. |
November 22–23, 1974 | South Korea | Seoul | Met with President Park Chung Hee. | |
November 23–24, 1974 | Soviet Union | Vladivostok | Met with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and discussed limitations of strategic arms. | |
3 | December 14–16, 1974 | Martinique | Fort-de-France | Met with President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. |
4 | May 28–31, 1975 | Belgium | Brussels | Attended the NATO Summit Meeting. Addressed the North Atlantic Council and met separately with NATO heads of state and government. |
May 31 – June 1, 1975 | Spain | Madrid | Met with Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Received keys to city from Mayor of Madrid Miguel Angel García-Lomas Mata. | |
June 1–3, 1975 | Austria | Salzburg | Met with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. | |
June 3, 1975 | Italy | Rome | Met with President Giovanni Leone and Prime Minister Aldo Moro. | |
June 3, 1975 | Vatican City | Apostolic Palace | Audience with Pope Paul VI. | |
5 | July 26–28, 1975 | West Germany | Bonn, Linz am Rhein |
Met with President Walter Scheel and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. |
July 28–29, 1975 | Poland | Warsaw, Kraków |
Official visit. Met with First Secretary Edward Gierek. | |
July 29 – August 2, 1975 | Finland | Helsinki | Attended opening session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Met with the heads of state and government of Finland, Great Britain, Turkey, West Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Also met with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. Signed the final act of the conference. | |
August 2–3, 1975 | Romania | Bucharest, Sinaia |
Official visit. Met with President Nicolae Ceaușescu. | |
August 3–4, 1975 | Yugoslavia | Belgrade | Official visit. Met with President Josip Broz Tito and Prime Minister Džemal Bijedić. | |
6 | November 15–17, 1975 | France | Rambouillet | Attended the 1st G6 summit. |
7 | December 1–5, 1975 | China | Peking | Official visit. Met with Party Chairman Mao Zedong and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. |
December 5–6, 1975 | Indonesia | Jakarta | Official visit. Met with President Suharto. | |
December 6–7, 1975 | Philippines | Manila | Official visit. Met with President Ferdinand Marcos. |
See also
- Foreign policy of the Richard Nixon administration
- Foreign policy of the Jimmy Carter administration
References
- ^ Brinkley, p. 78-79
- ^ Greene 1995, pp. 28–29.
- ^ Brinkley, pp. 129-130
- ^ Herring, 813–817
- ^ Greene 1995, pp. 122–123.
- ^ "Trip To China". Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. University of Texas. Archived from the original on September 24, 2015. Retrieved December 31, 2006.
- ^ Greene 1995, pp. 123–124.
- ^ Brinkley, pp. 82-83
- ^ Greene 1995, p. 126.
- ^ Ford, Gerald; Kissinger, Henry; Scowcroft, Brent (August 15, 1974). . Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. p. – via Wikisource. [scan ]
- ^ President's Inquiry on CSCE / Baltic States (Case File)
- ISBN 9781623768485.
- ^ Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from A. Denis Clift, Re: Replies to Correspondence Critical of CSCE
- ^ President Ford's Visit to Helsinki, July 29 - August 2, 1975, CSCE Briefing Book
- ^ Sarah B. Snyder, "Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President." Diplomacy & Statecraft 21.1 (2010): 87-106.
- ^ Brinkley, pp. 110-111
- ISBN 978-0-470-82181-7.
- ^ a b Brinkley, 89–98
- ^ Patterson 2005, pp. 98–99.
- ^ ISBN 0-8131-2349-6.
- ^ "Vietnam's President Thieu resigns". BBC News. April 21, 1975. Retrieved September 24, 2009.
- ^ Brinkley, pp. 93-94
- ISBN 0-911818-85-5.
- ISBN 1-59158-243-1
- ISBN 1-85649-610-4.
- ^ Herring, pp. 822–823
- ^ Gawthorpe, A. J. (2009), "The Ford Administration and Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific after the Fall of Saigon", The Historical Journal, 52(3):697–716.
- ^ "Debrief of the Mayaguez Captain and Crew". Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. May 19, 1975. Archived from the original on June 20, 2010. Retrieved November 18, 2010.
{{cite journal}}
: Cite journal requires|journal=
(help) - ^ "Capture and Release of SS Mayaguez by Khmer Rouge forces in May 1975". United States Merchant Marine. 2000. Retrieved December 31, 2006.
- ^ Patterson 2005, pp. 101–102.
- ^ Cécile Menétray-Monchau (August 2005), "The Mayaguez Incident as an Epilogue to the Vietnam War and its Reflection on the Post-Vietnam Political Equilibrium in Southeast Asia", Cold War History, p. 346.
- S2CID 155076037.
- ^ Oberdorfer, Don (2001), The two Koreas: a contemporary history (New York, NY: Basic Books), pp. 47–83.
- ^ Gawthorpe, "The Ford Administration and Security Policy", p. 711.
- ^ Gawthorpe, "The Ford Administration and Security Policy", pp. 710–714.
- ^ ISBN 0-8223-0972-6.
- ^ Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal, 1979, p.240
- ISBN 978-0-520-20766-0
- ISBN 0-520-20766-1, p261
- ^ George Lenczowski, American Presidents, and the Middle East, 1990, p.150
- ^ Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal, 1979, p.298
- ^ Herring, pp. 824–825
- ISBN 9781317504238.
- ^ Benedict R. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications," in Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, eds., East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation (University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 138-40.
- ^ Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability (Westview Press, 2000) pp 198-204.
- ^ "President Ford got Canada into G7". Canadian Broadcasting Company. December 27, 2006. Retrieved December 31, 2006.
- ^ "Travels of President Gerald R. Ford". U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian.
Bibliography
- Brinkley, Douglas (2007). Gerald R. Ford. New York, NY: Times Books. ISBN 978-0-8050-6909-9. short biography.
- Cameron, James, and Or Rabinowitz. "Eight Lost Years? Nixon, Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation Regime, 1969–1977." Journal of Strategic Studies 40.6 (2017): 839–866.
- Friedman, Jason. "Just a Caretaker?." in A Companion to Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter (2015) pp: 196–210.
- Friedman, Jason. "Gerald Ford, The Mayaguez Incident, and the Post-Imperial Presidency." Congress & the Presidency 37#1 (2010).
- Garthoff, Raymond L. Detente and Confrontation. (2nd ed. Brookings Institution, 1994). 1985 edition online
- Gavin, Victor. "The Nixon and Ford administrations and the future of post-Franco Spain (1970–6)." International History Review 38.5 (2016): 930–942. online[permanent dead link]
- Greene, John Robert (1995). The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-0639-4.
- Hanson, Mark W. "The Decline of Detente During the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford" (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2003) online
- Herring, George C. (2008). From Colony to Superpower; U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-507822-0.
- Jespersen, T. Christopher. "Kissinger, Ford, and Congress: the Very Bitter End in Vietnam". Pacific Historical Review 2002 71#3: 439–473. Online
- Jespersen, T. Christopher. "The Bitter End and the Lost Chance in Vietnam: Congress, the Ford Administration, and the Battle over Vietnam, 1975–76". Diplomatic History 2000 24#2: 265–293. Online
- Lamb, Christopher J. The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018) online review here; calls this book " the definitive account."
- Lasensky, Scott. "Dollarizing Peace: Nixon, Kissinger and the Creation of the US–Israeli Alliance." Israel Affairs 13.1 (2007): 164–186.
- Lee, J. Edward. Nixon, Ford and the Abandonment of South Vietnam (McFarland, 2015).
- Patterson, James (2005). Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195122169.
- Mieczkowski, Yanek. Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (University Press of Kentucky, 2005)
- Roady, Peter. "The Ford Administration, the National Security Agency, and the “Year of Intelligence”: Constructing a New Legal Framework for Intelligence." Journal of Policy History 32.3 (2020): 325-359.
- Sargent, Daniel J. A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (Oxford University Press, 2015); scholarly analysis by a historian excerpt
- Schulzinger, Robert D. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy (Columbia University Press, 1989).
- Warner, Geoffrey. "Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975, Part two: January 1972–January 1973." International Affairs 90.1 (2014): 185–198. online
- Wight, David M. "Kissinger’s Levantine Dilemma: The Ford Administration and the Syrian Occupation of Lebanon." Diplomatic History 37.1 (2013): 144–177.