Foreign policy of the Jimmy Carter administration
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76th Governor of Georgia
39th President of the United States
Policies
Appointments
Tenure
Presidential campaigns Post-presidency
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The
Upon taking office, Carter reoriented U.S. foreign policy towards a new emphasis on
Taking office during a period of relatively warm relations with both China and the Soviet Union, Carter initially continued the conciliatory policies of his predecessors. He normalized relations with China and revoked a defense treaty with Taiwan. He also continued the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, though he continued to criticize the Soviet Union for its human rights policies. After the start of the Soviet–Afghan War, he discarded his conciliatory policies towards the Soviet Union, began a period of military build-up, started a grain embargo, and provided aid to mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan. The final fifteen months of Carter's presidential tenure were marked by several major crises, including the 1979 oil crisis, the Iran hostage crisis, and the subsequent failed Operation Eagle Claw. These crises contributed to Carter's landslide defeat in the 1980 presidential election.
Leadership
Appointments
For the positions of
Vance pushed for détente with the Soviet Union, and clashed frequently with the hawkish Brzezinski. Vance tried to advance arms limitations by working on the SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union, which he saw as the central diplomatic issue of the time, but Brzezinski lobbied for a tougher, more assertive policy vis-à-vis the Soviets. He argued for strong condemnation of Soviet activity in Africa and in the Third World as well as successfully lobbying for normalized relations with the China in 1978. As Brzezinski took control of the negotiations with Beijing, Vance was marginalized and his influence began to wane. When revolution erupted in Iran in late 1978, the two were divided on how to support the United States' ally the Shah of Iran. Vance argued in favor of reforms while Brzezinski urged him to crack down – the 'iron fist' approach. Unable to receive a direct course of action from Carter, the mixed messages that the shah received from Vance and Brzezinski contributed to his confusion and indecision as he fled Iran in January 1979 and his regime collapsed.[4] After Vance resigned in 1980, Carter appointed Edmund Muskie, a well-respected senator with whom Carter had developed friendly relations, to serve as Secretary of State.[5]
Cold War
Carter took office during the
Human rights
Carter believed that previous administrations had erred in allowing the Cold War concerns and
Carter's ambassador to the
The more assertive human rights policy championed by Derian and State Department Policy Planning Director
Defense policy and missiles
Although his campaign platform in 1976 called for a reduction in defense spending, Carter called for a 3 three percent increase in the defense budget.[when?] He sought a sturdier defense posture by stationing medium range nuclear missiles in Europe aimed at the Soviet Union.[19] Carter and Brown worked to keep the balance with the Soviets in strategic weapons by improving land-based ICBMs, by equipping strategic bombers with cruise missiles and by deploying far more submarine-launched missiles tipped with MIRVs, or multiple warheads that could hit multiple targets. They continued development of the MX missile and modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Force.[20][21]
In March 1976, the Soviet Union first deployed the
On 12 December 1979, following European pressure for a response to the SS-20, Western foreign and defense ministers made the NATO Double-Track Decision.[25] They argued that the Warsaw Pact had "developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe": "theater" nuclear systems (i.e., tactical nuclear weapons.[26] In describing this "aggravated" situation, the ministers made direct reference to the SS-20 featuring "significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads". The ministers also attributed the altered situation to the deployment of the Soviet Tupolev Tu-22M strategic bomber, which they believed to display "much greater performance" than its predecessors. Furthermore, the ministers expressed concern that the Soviet Union had gained an advantage over NATO in "Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces" (LRTNF), and also significantly increased short-range theater nuclear capacity. To address these developments, the ministers adopted two policy "tracks". One thousand theater nuclear warheads, out of 7,400 such warheads, would be removed from Europe and the US would pursue bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union intended to limit theater nuclear forces. Should these negotiations fail, NATO would modernize its own LRTNF, or intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), by replacing US
Ford and Nixon had sought to reach agreement on a second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which had set upper limits on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Carter hoped to extend these talks by reaching an agreement to reduce, rather than merely set upper limits on, the nuclear arsenals of both countries.[31] At the same time, he criticized the Soviet Union's record with regard to human rights, partly because he believed the public would not support negotiations with the Soviets if the president seemed too willing to accommodate the Soviets.[32] Carter and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev reached an agreement in June 1979 in the form of SALT II, but Carter's waning popularity and the opposition of Republicans and neoconservative Democrats made ratification difficult.[32] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended detente and reopened the Cold War, while ending talk of ratifying SALT II.[33]
Afghanistan
Afghanistan had been non-aligned during the early stages of the Cold War.[34] In 1978, Communists under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki seized power.[35] The new regime—which was divided between Taraki's extremist Khalq faction and the more moderate Parcham—signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in December 1978.[35][36] Taraki's efforts to improve secular education and redistribute land were accompanied by mass executions and political oppression unprecedented in Afghan history, igniting a revolt by Afghan mujahideen rebels.[35] Following a general uprising in April 1979, Taraki was deposed by Khalq rival Hafizullah Amin in September.[35][36] Soviet leaders feared that an Islamist government in Afghanistan would threaten the control of Soviet Central Asia, and, as the unrest continued, they deployed 30,000 soldiers to the Soviet–Afghan border.[37] Historian George C. Herring states Carter and Brzezinski both saw Afghanistan as a potential "trap" that could expend Soviet resources in a fruitless war, and the U.S. began sending aid to the mujahideen rebels in mid-1979.[38] However, a 2020 review of declassified U.S. documents by Conor Tobin in the journal Diplomatic History found that "a Soviet military intervention was neither sought nor desired by the Carter administration ... The small-scale covert program that developed in response to the increasing Soviet influence was part of a contingency plan if the Soviets did intervene militarily, as Washington would be in a better position to make it difficult for them to consolidate their position, but not designed to induce an intervention."[39] By December, Amin's government had lost control of much of the country, prompting the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan, execute Amin, and install Parcham leader Babrak Karmal as president.[35][36]
Carter was surprised by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community during 1978 and 1979 was that Moscow would not forcefully intervene.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought a significant change in Carter's foreign policy and ended the period of detente that had begun in the mid-1960s. Returning to a policy of containment, the United States reconciled with Cold War allies and increased the defense budget, leading to a new arms race with the Soviet Union.[47] U.S. support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan would continue until the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.[40]
Middle East
Historian Jørgen Jensehaugen argues that by the time Carter left office in January 1981, he:
was in an odd position—he had attempted to break with traditional US policy but ended up fulfilling the goals of that tradition, which had been to break up the Arab alliance, side-line the Palestinians, build an alliance with Egypt, weaken the Soviet Union and secure Israel.[48]
Camp David Accords
On taking office, Carter decided to attempt to mediate the long-running Arab–Israeli conflict.[49] He sought a comprehensive settlement between Israel and its neighbors through a reconvening of the 1973 Geneva Conference, but these efforts had collapsed by the end of 1977.[50] Though unsuccessful in reconvening the conference, Carter convinced Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat to visit Israel in 1978. Sadat's visit drew the condemnation of other Arab League countries, but Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin each expressed an openness to bilateral talks. Begin sought security guarantees; Sadat sought the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula and home rule for the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli-occupied territories that were largely populated by Palestinian Arabs. Israel had taken control of the West Bank and Gaza in the 1967 Six-Day War, while the Sinai had been occupied by Israel since the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.[51]
Seeking to further negotiations, Carter invited Begin and Sadat to the presidential retreat of
On March 26, 1979, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in Washington, D.C.[54] Carter's role in getting the treaty was essential. Author Aaron David Miller concluded the following: "No matter whom I spoke to—Americans, Egyptians, or Israelis—most everyone said the same thing: no Carter, no peace treaty."[55] Carter himself viewed the agreement as his most important accomplishment in office.[53]
Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis
The Carter administration's new demands for human rights angered the Shah, and split itself internally. Vance and the State Department made it a high priority, while Brzezinski warned that it would undermine the strength of America's most important ally in the region. The State Department's Bureau of Human Rights took an activist approach, under Derian's leadership. Carter allowed the sale of riot control equipment to suppress increasingly vocal and violent protests, especially from the religious element.[60][61]
By 1978, the Iranian Revolution had broken out against the Shah's rule.[62] Secretary of State Vance argued that the Shah should institute a series of reforms to appease the voices of discontent, while Brzezinski argued in favor of a crackdown on dissent. The mixed messages that the Shah received from Vance and Brzezinski contributed to his confusion and indecision. The Shah went into exile, leaving a caretaker government in control. A popular religious figure, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, returned from exile in February 1979 to popular acclaim. As the unrest continued, Carter allowed Pahlavi into the United States for medical treatment.[63] Carter and Vance were both initially reluctant to admit Pahlavi due to concerns about the reaction in Iran, but Iranian leaders assured them that it would not cause an issue.[64] In November 1979, shortly after Pahlavi was allowed to enter the U.S., a group of Iranians stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took 66 American captives, beginning the Iran hostage crisis.[63] Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan ordered the militants to release the hostages, but he resigned from office after Khomeini backed the militants.[64]
The crisis quickly became the subject of international and domestic attention, and Carter vowed to secure the release of the hostages. He refused the Iranian demand of the return of Pahlavi in exchange for the release of the hostages. His approval ratings rose as Americans rallied around his response, but the crisis became increasingly problematic for his administration as it continued.[65] In an attempt to rescue the hostages, Carter launched Operation Eagle Claw in April 1980. The operation was a total disaster, and it ended in the death of eight American soldiers. The failure of the operation strengthened Ayatollah Khomenei's position in Iran and badly damaged Carter's domestic standing.[66] Carter was dealt another blow when Vance, who had consistently opposed the operation, resigned.[67] Iran refused to negotiate the return of the hostages until Iraq launched an invasion in September 1980. With Algeria serving as an intermediary, negotiations continued until an agreement was reached in January 1981. In return for releasing the 52 captives, Iran accepted over $7 billion in monetary compensation and the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the United States. Iran waited to release the captives until hours after Carter left office on January 20, 1981.[68]
Latin America
Panama Canal treaties
Since the 1960s, Panama had called for the United States to cede control of the Panama Canal.[69] The bipartisan national policy of turning over the Canal to Panama had been established by presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford, but negotiations had dragged on for a dozen years. Carter made the cession of the Panama Canal a priority, believing it would implement his call for a moral cleaning of American foreign policy and win approval across Latin America as a gracious apology for American wrongdoing. He also feared that another postponement of negotiations might precipitate violent upheaval in Panama, which could damage or block the canal.[70]
The Carter administration negotiated the
During its ratification debate, the Senate added amendments that granted the U.S. the right to intervene militarily to keep the canal open, which the Panamanians assented to after further negotiations.[74] In March 1978, the Senate ratified both treaties by a margin of 68-to-32. The Canal Zone and all its facilities were turned over to Panama on 31 December 1999.[75][76]
Cuba
Carter hoped to improve relations with Cuba upon taking office, but any thaw in relations was prevented by ongoing Cold War disputes in Central America and Africa. In early 1980, Cuban leader Fidel Castro announced that anyone who wished to leave Cuba would be allowed to do so through the port of Mariel. After Carter announced that the United States would provide "open arms for the tens of thousands of refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination", Cuban Americans arranged the Mariel boatlift. The Refugee Act, signed earlier in the year, had provided for annual cap of 19,500 Cuban immigrants to the United States per year, and required that those refugees go through a review process. By September, 125,000 Cubans had arrived in the United States, and many faced a lack of adequate food and housing. Carter was widely criticized for his handling of the boatlift, especially in the electorally important state of Florida.[77]
El Salvador
In his last week in office Carter sent five million dollars in military aid to the Revolutionary Government Junta of El Salvador.[78]
Asia
In dealing with Asia, Carter transformed the regional landscape by normalizing relations with China, while maintaining good terms with Japan.[79] On the downside, Taiwan felt deserted, and troop withdrawals from South Korea were mishandled. Carter hoped that, by improving relations with China, the Soviet Union would be pressured to moderate its aggressive relationship with Afghanistan, to no avail. The U.S. was hostile to Vietnam because it was allied to the USSR. Carter supported China in its short border war with Vietnam in 1979. One surprise was his support for the Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia fighting against Vietnam's invasion, despite its terrible human rights record.[80] Carter was hostile to Pakistan because of its human rights violations and efforts to build nuclear weapons. Overnight he reversed course in 1979 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan now became the main American route for sending support to the anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan.[81] Carter at first was especially friendly toward India, but when India sided more with Moscow, Carter backed away and refused to help with India's nuclear energy program. The United States augmented its military strength in the Indian Ocean, seeing it as an extension of the Pacific and a prime link to the Persian Gulf oil supplies.[82][83] In the long run, Reagan and other successors picked up on Carter's human rights goal, and so it proved an important innovation in American policy. Good terms with China flourished for another decade.[84][85]
Rapprochement with China
Continuing a dramatic rapprochement begun during the Nixon administration, Carter sought closer relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The two countries increasingly collaborated against the Soviet Union, and the Carter administration tacitly consented to the
South Korea
Carter was outraged at human rights abuses in South Korea under President
After General Chun Doo-hwan overthrew the government during both the Coup d'état of December Twelfth and the Coup d'état of May Seventeenth and established yet another dictatorship, the students and local residents of the city of Gwangju in Jeolla Province rose up in revolt against the newly founded military dictatorship and demanded the restoration of democracy.[91] President Carter helped provide assistance to Chun by allowing him to consolidate and cement his grip on power, such as giving approval to Chun's plans to deploy the ROK military divisions stationed at the DMZ south towards Gwangju.[91][92] Carter's support for Chun gave him the much needed legitimacy and support he needed to crush the Gwangju Uprising, which led to the deaths and disappearances of hundreds. Even decades after the Gwangju massacre, Carter never publicly commented on his role in assisting Chun to crush the pro-democracy uprising.[93]
Indonesia
The Carter administration continued the Nixon and Ford administration's policy of supporting the "New Order" in Indonesia under Suharto. Although the regime was usually classified as a dictatorship by foreign observers, it was still supported by the U.S. due to its strong opposition to Communism. The Carter administration continued to support the regime, even in spite of its violation of human rights in the December 1975 invasion and occupation of East Timor.[94]
Africa
In sharp contrast to Nixon and Ford, Carter gave priority to sub-Sahara Africa.[95][96] The chief policy person was Andrew Young, a leader in Atlanta's black community who became Ambassador to the United Nations. Young opened up friendly relationships with key African leaders, especially in Nigeria. A highly controversial issue was US relations with South Africa, which was under criticism from other African states for its policy of racial segregation (apartheid) and continued occupation of Namibia, which had been deemed illegal by the United Nations. Young began United Nations discussions on Namibian independence which went nowhere, and South Africa would not grant that territory independence until 1991, long after Carter left office.[97] Young advocated comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa after the murder of anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko in 1977, but Carter refused and only imposed a limited arms embargo.[98]
Until 1975, the United States had largely ignored Southern Africa. Weak Soviet-backed insurgencies existed in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Namibia, but did not appear to threaten the colonial and white minority governments of those countries. The dissolution of the Portuguese Empire in April 1974 meant the end of colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique. The region emerged as a Cold War battleground in 1976, after Cuba sent a large military force that helped the Marxist MPLA movement seize power in Angola.
The Carter administration tried unsuccessfully to facilitate dialogue between South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), which was the leading pro-independence party in Namibia. Vance and Brzezinski clashed over foreign policy in Angola and Namibia, but the U.S. never became directly involved in either country and the Carter administration never found an effective solution. Meanwhile, Cuba and the Soviet Union gave strong military support to both the MPLA and SWAPO.[99][97]
When
Under Carter an allyship with Liberia's Samuel Doe who had come to power in a 1980 coup was pursued.[107] Carter provided aid[108] and sent US troops to train the Liberian army.[109]
Historians generally agree that the Carter administration's initiatives in Africa were largely unsuccessful, but offer multiple explanations for the policy failures.[110] The orthodox interpretation posits Carter as a dreamy star-eyed idealist. Revisionists said that did not matter nearly as much as the intense rivalry between dovish Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and hawkish National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.[111] Meanwhile, there are now post-revisionist historians who blame his failures on his confused management style and his refusal to make tough decisions.[112] Along post-revisionist lines, Nancy Mitchell in a monumental book depicts Carter as a decisive but ineffective Cold Warrior, who, nevertheless had some successes because Soviet incompetence was even worse.[113]
Canada
Relations with Canada had deteriorated under the Nixon administration on many points, including trade disputes, defense agreements, energy, fishing, the environment, cultural imperialism, and foreign policy. They changed for the better when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and Carter found a better rapport. The late 1970s saw a more sympathetic American attitude toward Canadian political and economic needs, the pardoning of draft evaders who had moved to Canada, and the passing of old matters such as Watergate and the Vietnam War. Canada more than ever welcomed American investments during "the stagflation" that hurt both nations.[114]
International trips
The number of visits per country where he travelled are:
- One visit to Austria, Belgium, Brazil, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Liberia, Nigeria, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Vatican City, Venezuela, West Germany and Yugoslavia
- Two visits to France, Japan and Mexico
- Three visits to Egypt
See also
References
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 30–32
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 43–44
- ^ Joel Kramer Goldstein, The White House Vice Presidency: The Path to Significance, Mondale to Biden (2016) ch 4.
- ^ Justin Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Grand Strategist (2018).
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, p. 224
- ^ Herring, pp. 830–833
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 44–46
- ^ Herring, pp. 845–846
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 46–47
- ^ Herring, pp. 846–847
- ^ Herring, p. 833
- ^ Ottaway, David B. (1 April 1978). "Carter Arrives in Nigeria on State Visit". New York Times. Retrieved 4 May 2018.
- ^ Herring, p. 842
- ^ Herring, pp. 842–844
- ISBN 978-0801448157.
- ^ Herring, pp. 844–845
- ^ Herring, p. 846
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, p. 46
- ^ Brian J. Auten, Carter's Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy (2009) excerpt.
- ^ Sam C. Sarkesian, ed. Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years (1980)
- ^ Robert D. McFadden, "Harold Brown, Defense Secretary in Carter Administration, Dies at 91" The New York Times January 5, 2019.
- ^ Cant, James (May 1998). "The development of the SS-20" (PDF). Glasgow Thesis Service. Retrieved 9 January 2019.
- ^ Bohlen (2012) pp 6-7.
- ^ "Paul Nitze and A Walk in the Woods – A Failed Attempt at Arms Control". Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. 1998.
- ^ a b Bohlen (2012) p 7.
- ^ Michael Legge, "Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response" (RAND Corporation, 1983) online
- ^ "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Chronology". Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 15 August 2016.
- ^ NATO, "Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The "Double-Track" Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces)" (1979) online
- ^ Legge, "Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response" (1983), pp=1–2, 35–37
- ^ Bohlen (2012) pp 8-9.
- ^ Herring, pp. 835–836
- ^ a b Zelizer, pp. 57-58
- ^ Zelizer, p. 103
- ^ Herring, pp. 852–853
- ^ ISBN 9780307546982.
- ^ ISBN 9781845112578.
- ^ Weiner, pp. 422–423
- ^ Herring, pp. 853–854
- .
- ^ ISBN 978-0815725954.
- ^ Weiner, pp. 423–425
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, p. 197
- ISBN 9781416543367.
- ^ a b Herring, pp. 853–855
- ISBN 978-1-84593-355-5.
- ^ Robert L. Paarlberg, "Lessons of the grain embargo." Foreign Affairs 59.1 (1980): 144-162. online
- ^ Herring, pp. 855–857
- ^ Jørgen Jensehaugen. Arab-Israeli Diplomacy under Carter: The US, Israel and the Palestinians (2018) p. 178, quoted on H-DIPLO)
- ^ Jørgen Jensehaugen, Arab-Israeli Diplomacy under Carter: The US, Israel and the Palestinians (2018).
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 53–56
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 104–106
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 150–151
- ^ a b Herring, pp. 841–842
- ^ Bickerton and Klausner, pp. 190–193; 198–200.
- ^ Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land (Bantam Books, 2008), page 159.
- ^ a b Herring, pp. 847–848
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, p. 156
- ^ The Making of US Foreign Policy. Manchester University Press. 1997. p. 72.
- ^ Gill Guererro, Javier (2016). The Carter Administration and the Fall of Iran’s Pahlavi Dynasty US-Iran Relations on the Brink of the 1979 Revolution. Palgrave Macmillan US. p. 57.
- ^ Javier Gil Guerrero, "Human Rights and Tear Gas: The Question of Carter Administration Officials Opposed to the Shah." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 43.3 (2016): 285-301.
- JSTOR 2152227.
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, p. 155
- ^ a b Herring, pp. 848–850
- ^ a b Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 193–194
- ^ Herring, p. 850
- ^ Herring, pp. 858–859
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 211–213
- ^ Patterson, pp. 125–126
- ^ Robert A. Strong, "Jimmy Carter and the Panama Canal Treaties." Presidential Studies Quarterly (1991) 21.2: 269-286 online.
- ^ Gaddis Smith, Morality Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (1986), pp. 111–15.
- ^ Zelizer, pp. 69-70
- ^ David Skidmore, "Foreign Policy Interest Groups and Presidential Power: Jimmy Carter and the Battle over Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties" in Herbert D. Rosenbaum, Alexej Ugrinsky, eds. Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years (1994). pp. 297–327. online Archived 2019-01-21 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Michael Hogan, The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy (1986), p. 120.
- ^ Herring, pp. 837–838
- ^ Zelizer, pp. 69–76
- ^ Mary C. Swilling, "The Business of the Canal: The Economics and Politics of the Carter Administration's Panama Canal Zone Initiative, 1978". Essays in Economic & Business History (2012) 22:275-89. online.
- ^ Kaufman and Kaufman, 2006, pp. 227–228
- ^ LeoGrande, William M. (1998). Our Own Backyard The United States in Central America, 1977-1992. University of North Carolina Press. p. 95.
- ^ Michael Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (2019) pp 382-86.
- ^ John W. Garver, China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic (2016) pp 383–400.
- ^ Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Superpowers (1982).
- ^ Thomas Perry Thornton, "Between the Stools?: US Policy towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration." Asian Survey 22.10 (1982): 959-977.
- ^ Thomas Perry Thornton, "American Interest in India Under Carter and Reagan." SAIS Review 5.1 (1985): 179-190.
- ^ Green, By More Than Providence p 386.
- ^ Mary E. Stuckey, "Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Instrumental Effects of Presidential Rhetoric." The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address ed. by Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (2010): 291-312.
- ^ Herring, pp. 839–840
- ^ Herring, pp. 855–856
- ^ Strong, Robert A. (4 October 2016). "Jimmy Carter: Foreign Affairs". Miller Center. University of Virginia. Retrieved 21 November 2017.
- ^ Lyong Choi, "Human Rights, Popular Protest, and Jimmy Carter's Plan to Withdraw US Troops from South Korea." Diplomatic History 41.5 (2017): 933-958.
- ^ William H. Gleysteen Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (2000).
- ^ a b Shorrock, Tim (7 October 1996). "Come Clean on U.S. Role in Kwangju : South Korea: Its 'trial of the century' examined the nation's militaristic past; Washington must now examine its part". LA Times. Retrieved 21 August 2023.
- ^ Kim, In Jeong; Shorrock, Tim (14 December 2021). "Chun Doo-hwan's bloody Gwangju legacy is America's problem too". Responsible Statecraft. Retrieved 21 August 2023.
- ^ Kim, In Jeong; Shorrock, Tim (28 May 2020). "2 Days in May That Shattered Korean Democracy". The Nation. Retrieved 21 August 2023.
- ISBN 978-0-7190-4693-3.
- ^ Gaddis Smith, Morality Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (1986) pp 133-56.
- ^ For highly detailed scholarly coverage see Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War (Stanford UP, 2016), 913pp. excerpt
- ^ a b Piero Gleijeses, "A Test of Wills: Jimmy Carter, South Africa, and the Independence of Namibia." Diplomatic History 34.5 (2010): 853-891.
- ^ Alex Thomson, "The Diplomacy of Impasse: the Carter Administration and Apartheid South Africa." Diplomacy & Statecraft 21.1 (2010): 107-124.
- ^ George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (2008) pp 844–845.
- ^ Andrew J. DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (2003).
- ^ Robert Schulzinger, ed., A Companion to American Foreign Relations (2006), pp 115-17.
- ^ John Soares, "Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War." Presidential Studies Quarterly 48.4 (2018): 865-866.
- ^ "Zaire: A Country Study", "Relations with the United States" Archived 12 December 2012 at archive.today. Lcweb2.loc.gov (30 November 1973). Retrieved on 23 April 2014.
- ISBN 0394753089, p. 46
- ^ Young and Turner, p. 389
- ^ Elliot and Dymally, p. 88
- ^ Gershoni, Yekutiel (2022). Liberia Under Samuel Doe, 1980–1985 The Politics of Personal Rule. Lexington Books. p. 301.
- ^ Gershoni, Yekutiel (2022). Liberia Under Samuel Doe, 1980–1985 The Politics of Personal Rule. Lexington Books. p. 54.
- ^ Shellum, Brian G. (2018). African American Officers in Liberia A Pestiferous Rotation, 1910–1942. Potomac Books. p. 196.
- ^ Franck Gerits, "Jimmy Carter in Africa" History (2017) 102#351, pp 545-547.
- ^ Donna Jackson, Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 2007)
- ^ Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration, (2008)).
- ^ Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War (2016) p 688.
- ^ Lily Gardner Feldman, "Canada and the United States in the 1970s: Rift and Reconciliation." The World Today 34.12 (1978): 484-492. online
Further reading
- Berggren, D. Jason, and Nicol C. Rae. "Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, foreign policy, and an evangelical presidential style." Presidential Studies Quarterly 36.4 (2006): 606-632 online.
- Bickerton, Ian J.; Carla L. Klausner (2007). A history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall. ISBN 9780132223355.
- Borshoff, Isabella. “What is a Human Rights Foreign Policy?: Definitions, Double Standards, and the Carter Administration,” The Historian 78:4 (2016): 710-732, DOI: 10/1111/hisn.12338
- Daigle, Craig. "Beyond Camp David: Jimmy Carter, Palestinian Self-Determination, and Human Rights." Diplomatic History 42.5 (2018): 802–830.
- Dumbrell, John. American foreign policy: Carter to Clinton (Macmillan International Higher Education, 1996).
- Dumbrell, John. The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation' (Manchester University Press, 1993)
- Glad, Betty. An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Cornell University Press, 2009).
- Goheen, Robert F. "US Policy Toward India During the Carter Presidency." in The hope and the reality: US-Indian relations from Roosevelt to Reagan ed. H.A. Gould and S. Ganguly. (1992).
- Green, Michael J. By more than providence: Grand strategy and American power in the Asia Pacific since 1783 (Columbia UP, 2017) pp 363–386. online.
- Garthoff, Raymond L. Détente and confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan (Brookings, 1985) pp 563–1007. online
- Herring, George C. (2008). From Colony to Superpower; U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-507822-0.
- Jensehaugen, Jørgen. Arab-Israeli diplomacy under Carter: the US, Israel and the Palestinians (Bloomsbury, 2018).
- Kaufman, Scott. Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (Northern Illinois University Press, 2008)
- Kaufman, Burton I. (2006). The Presidency of James Earl Carter (2nd ed.). University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0700614714. online 1st ed.
- Lazarowitz, Arlene. "Ethnic Influence and American Foreign Policy: American Jewish Leaders and President Jimmy Carter." Shofar 29.1 (2010): 112–136. online
- Mitchell, Nancy. Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the cold war (Stanford UP, 2018).
- Muravchik, Joshua. The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy (University Press of America, 1986).
- Patterson, James (2005). Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195122169.
- Rosenbaum, Herbert D. and Alexej Ugrinsky, eds. Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years (1994) 532pp; essays by experts
- Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. Dropping the torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic boycott, and the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- Sargent, Daniel J. A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (Oxford University Press, 2015); scholarly analysis by a historian excerpt
- Schmitz, David F., and Vanessa Walker. “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 28:1 (2004): 113-144, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2004.00400.x.
- Smith, Gaddis. Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years. (Hill and Wang, 1986); a standard scholarly history. online
- Strong, Robert A. (2000). Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. ISBN 0-8071-2445-1.
- Strieff, Daniel. Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: The Politics of Presidential Diplomacy (Springer, 2015).
- Strong, Robert. Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Louisiana State University Press, 2000).
- Talbott, Strobe, Endgame: The Inside Story of Salt II (New York: Harpercollins, 1979) online
- Thornton, Richard C. The Carter Years: Toward a New Global Order (1991) 596pp; comprehensive coverage of foreign policy
- Wallis, Christopher. "The Thinker, The Doer and The Decider Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance and the Bureaucratic Wars of the Carter Administration" (PhD Thesis, Northumbria University 2018).
- Weiner, Tim (2008). Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. Anchor Books. ISBN 9780307389008.
- Zelizer, Julian (2010). Jimmy Carter. Times Books. ISBN 978-0-8050-8957-8.
Primary sources and memoirs
- Brzeziński, Zbigniew. Power and Principle. Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (1983)
- Carter, Jimmy. Keeping faith: Memoirs of a president (U of Arkansas Press, 1995). online
- Lafeber, Walter. "From confusion to Cold War: The memoirs of the Carter administration." Diplomatic History 8.1 (1984): 1-12 online
- Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America's Foreign Policy (1983) online.