Naval tactics

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A five-country multinational fleet, during Operation Enduring Freedom in the Oman Sea. In four descending columns, from the top left to the bottom right: Maestrale, De Grasse; USS John C. Stennis, Charles de Gaulle, Surcouf; USS Port Royal, HMS Ocean, USS John F. Kennedy, HNLMS Van Amstel ; and Luigi Durand de la Penne

Naval tactics and doctrine is the collective name for methods of engaging and defeating an enemy ship or fleet in battle at sea during naval warfare, the naval equivalent of military tactics on land.

Naval tactics are distinct from naval strategy. Naval tactics are concerned with the movements a commander makes in battle, typically in the presence of the enemy. Naval strategy concerns the overall strategy for achieving victory and the large movements by which a commandant or commander secures the advantage of fighting at a place convenient to himself.

Modern naval tactics are based on tactical doctrines developed after World War II, following the obsolescence of the battleship and the development of long-range missiles. Since there has been no major naval conflict since World War II, apart from the Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 and the Falklands War, many of these doctrines reflect scenarios developed for planning purposes. Critics argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reduction in the size and capabilities of the Russian Navy renders most such fleet-on-fleet scenarios obsolete.

Key concepts

A central concept in Western modern naval fleet warfare is

enemy
while avoiding detection.

The open sea provides the most favorable battlespace for a surface fleet. The presence of land[1] and the topography of an area compress the battlespace, limit the opportunities to maneuver, make it easier for an enemy to predict the location of the fleet, and make the detection of enemy forces more difficult. In shallow waters, the detection of submarines and mines is especially problematic.

One scenario that was the focus of American and NATO naval planning during the Cold War was a conflict between two modern and well equipped fleets on the high seas, the clash of the United States/NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. Because the Cold War ended without direct total war between the two sides, the outcome of such an action remains hypothetical, but was broadly understood to include, towards the late Cold War, multiple salvoes of anti-ship missiles against the Americans and U.S. attempts to air strike Soviet land bases and/or fleets. Given the eventual strategic surprise effectiveness of anti-ship missiles, the outcome of such a clash is far from being clear.

The main consideration is for carrier battle group (CVBGs). Critics of current naval doctrine argue that although such a fleet battle is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future, Cold War thinking continues to dominate naval practice.[2] However, others point toward the increased naval budgets of Russia and South and East Asia as a possibility that conventional naval combat in the future may become relevant again.

Naval tactics and weapons systems can be categorized by the type of opponents they are intended to fight.

Anti-air warfare (AAW) involves action against aircraft and incoming missiles. Anti-surface warfare (ASuW) focuses on attacking and defending against surface warships. Anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) deals with the detection and destruction of enemy submarines.

The key threat in modern naval combat is the airborne

Silkworm. Close-range missile defence in the modern age depends heavily on close-in weapon systems (CIWS) such as the Phalanx or Goalkeeper
.

Though traveling under water and at lower speeds, torpedoes present a similar threat. As is the case with missiles, torpedoes are self-propelled and can be launched from surface, subsurface, and air platforms. Modern versions of this weapon present a wide selection of homing technologies specially suited to their particular target. There are far fewer means of destroying incoming torpedoes compared to missiles.

shallow water operations has greatly increased this advantage. Mere suspicion of a submarine threat can force a fleet to commit resources to removing it, as the consequences of an undetected enemy submarine can obviously be lethal. The threat posed by British submarines during the Falklands War of 1982 was one of the reasons why the Argentine Navy was limited in its operations.[3]
A single submarine at sea also impacted operations in the Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971.

Conventional naval forces are also seen as providing a capability for

power projection. In several naval operations, the aircraft carrier has been used to support land forces rather than to supply air control over the sea. Carriers were used in this way during the Gulf War.[4]

History

Naval tactics have evolved over time with developments in naval technology and the evolution of

naval history
into thematic topics:

The modern period of naval tactics began with the widespread replacement of naval guns with missiles and long-range combat aircraft after World War II and is the basis for most of the tactical doctrine used today.

Post-World War II conflicts

The Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971

The

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was the most significant conflict involving naval forces since World War II. Over two thousand sailors died, and multiple ships were sunk. Significantly, the first submarine sinking of a ship since World War II occurred when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor sank an Indian ASW frigate INS Khukri
. Passive/active sonar, homing torpedoes, air strikes on naval facilities and fast missile craft were all utilized in this war.

In the western theatre of the war, the

Operation Trident[6] on the night of 4–5 December,[6] using missile boats, sinking Pakistani destroyer PNS Khaibar and minesweeper PNS Muhafiz; PNS Shah Jahan was also badly damaged.[6] In response, Pakistani submarines sought out major Indian warships.[7] 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict. Operation Trident was followed by Operation Python[6] on the night of 8–9 December,[6] in which Indian missile boats attacked the Karachi port, resulting in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships.[6]
Since Pakistan's naval headquarters and almost its entire fleet operated from the port city of Karachi, this was a major strategic victory that enabled the Indian navy to attain complete naval superiority, and to partially blockade Pakistan.

In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command completely isolated East Pakistan by a

sank en route under mysterious circumstances off Visakhapatnam's coast[9][10] On 9 December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest wartime loss when the Pakistani submarine Hangor sank the frigate Khukri in the Arabian Sea, resulting in a loss of 18 officers and 176 sailors.[11]

Alize aircraft

The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships – Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi –[12] and ten smaller vessels were captured.[13] Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka.[14] According to one Pakistan scholar, Tariq Ali, Pakistan lost half its navy in the war.[15]

The Falklands War

The Falklands War of 1982 has been the next most significant conflict involving naval forces since World War II. The primary combat was between the Argentine Air force, based on the mainland, and the British naval force centered on aircraft carriers. Argentine naval forces played only a minor role in the conflict.

The war demonstrated the importance of naval

airborne early warning (AEW). Vital to British success was the protection of the two Royal Navy aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. In 1982, the Royal Navy had effectively zero over-the-horizon radar capability, so to protect the British naval taskforce several destroyers and frigates were sent on radar picket duty to form the first line of defense against Argentine air attacks. As a result, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Argentine Exocet missile strike. Following the conflict, the Royal Navy modified some Westland Sea King
helicopters for the AEW role. Other navies (including France, Spain and Italy) have since included AEW aircraft or helicopters on their carriers.

The conflict also led to an increased interest in the close defense capabilities of naval ships, including close-in weapon systems (CIWS) as a last-ditch defense against incoming missiles. The attack on the US frigate USS Stark on patrol in the Persian Gulf in 1987 also highlighted the danger of anti-ship missiles. In the case of Stark, the Iraqi Exocet missiles were not detected and Stark's CIWS was not turned on as the ship was not expecting an attack.[16]

The Falklands War also saw the only time a warship has been sunk by a nuclear-powered submarine in a hostile attack, when the British nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror attacked the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano with torpedoes. With their nuclear propulsion plants, the submarines were able to remain on station virtually undetected.[3][clarification needed]

Other conflicts

Another large naval operation conducted by a major power took place when the US Navy provided protection to Kuwaiti-owned tankers in the Persian Gulf between 1987 and 1988, during the Iran–Iraq War.

Naval forces have played a supporting role in some land battles. US battleships provided naval gunfire support during the Vietnam War and the 1991 Gulf War. During the Falklands War, British destroyers and frigates carried out shelling of Argentine positions.

The

Libyan Civil War
, of which the British Armed Forces played a decisive role.

The

P-3 Orion
were also used in the overland surveillance role over Afghanistan as well as during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

References

  1. ^ Hughes WP, 2000, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd Ed, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MA.
  2. ^ Wasted warships, by Lewis Page Prospect magazine, issue # 95, 20 February 2004
  3. ^ a b Swartz, Luke (1998). "Beyond the General Belgrano and Sheffield: Lessons in Undersea and Surface Warfare from the Falkland Islands Conflict" (PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-06.
  4. ^ Grant, R.G.. Battle at Sea: 3000 Years of Naval Warfare. New York, NY: DK publishing, 2008.
  5. ^ Warming, Rolf (January 2019). "An Introduction to Hand-to-Hand Combat at Sea: General Characteristics and Shipborne Technologies from c. 1210 BCE to 1600 CE". On War on Board: Archaeological and Historical Perspectives on Early Modern Maritime Violence and Warfare (Ed. Johan Rönnby).
  6. ^ a b c d e f "Indo-Pakistani War of 1971". Global Security. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
  7. ^ Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century By Geoffrey Till page 179
  8. .
  9. ^ "Remembering our war heroes". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 2 December 2006. Archived from the original on 7 November 2012.
  10. ^ 'Does the US want war with India?'. Rediff.com (31 December 2004). Retrieved on 14 April 2011.
  11. ^ "Trident, Grandslam and Python: Attacks on Karachi". Bharat Rakshak. Archived from the original on 26 September 2009. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
  12. ^ "Utilisation of Pakistan merchant ships seized during the 1971 war". Irfc-nausena.nic.in. Archived from the original on 1 March 2012. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
  13. ^ "Damage Assesment [sic] – 1971 Indo-Pak Naval War" (PDF). B. Harry. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 May 2010. Retrieved 20 June 2010.
  14. ^ "Military Losses in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War". Venik. Archived from the original on 25 February 2002. Retrieved 30 May 2005.
  15. . In a two-week war, Pakistan lost half its navy.
  16. (PDF) on December 2, 2007. Retrieved 2007-11-06.
  17. ^ "Killing Al Qaeda: The Navy's Role" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2010-12-31. Retrieved 2011-03-30.

Further reading

  • Rodger, Nicholas, "Image and Reality in Eighteenth-Century Naval Tactics." Mariner's Mirror 89, No. 3 (2003), pp. 281–96.