Operation Jackpot
Operation Jackpot | |||||||
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Part of Bangladesh Liberation War | |||||||
Map of Operation Jackpot, Indian Supply network for Mukti Bahini. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Bangladesh | Pakistan | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Shahed Ali Khan Abdul Wahed Chowdhury Ahsanullah Badiul Alam Shahjahan |
A. A. K. Niazi Khadim Hussain R. Farman Ali Mohammad Shariff Ahmad Zamir | ||||||
Lt. Col * Major A.T.M Haider * Major C. R. Dutta * Major Mir Shawkat Ali | |||||||
Units involved | |||||||
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East Pakistan Civil Armed Force
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Operation Jackpot was a codename for three operations undertaken by the Bengali Mukti Bahini in former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) against the Federation of Pakistan at the climax of the Bangladesh Liberation War.[3][5]
After the
The third operation was designed by Lt. Gen Sagat Singh, commander of the Indian Army IV Corps, attached to the Eastern Command, and the Bangladesh forces operating in his operational area. These forces fought against the Pakistani forces in Sylhet, Comilla, and Chittagong as part of the overall campaign from 21 November to 16 December 1971.[7]
Background
After the postponing of the session
Prelude
The
Indian Army dubbed the operation to support Mukti Bahini's "Operation Jackpot", setting up a coordinated enterprise under the Eastern Command for meeting the material support, logistical, and training needs, and to some extent, lend operational support and various planning advices.[1][3] At the operational stage at the Indian Army's Headquarters in New Delhi, Maj. Gen. Onkar Singh Kalkat oversaw the operation for two months, before the operational command was assumed by Maj. Gen. B. N. 'Jimmy' Sarcar.[15]
The operational setup and execution of plan
The border areas around East Pakistan was divided into six logistical sectors, each to be commanded by a brigadier from the Indian Army.[15]
The Indian logistical sectors for this operation were:
- Alpha (HQ: Murti Camp, West Bengal), C.O. Brig. B. C. Joshi.
- Bravo (HQ: Rajgaunj, West Bengal), C.O. Brig. Prem Singh.
- Charlie (HQ: Chakulia, Bihar), C.O. Brig. N. A. Salik.
- Delta (HQ: Devta Mura, Tripura), C.O. Brig. Sabeg Singh.
- Echo (HQ: Masimpur, Assam), C.O. Brig. M. B. Wadh, co-ordinating logistics.
- Foxtrot, (HQ: Tura, Meghalaya), C.O. Brig. Sant Singh.
Through this network, Mukti Bahini forces communicated with the Headquarters of the Mukti Bahini Exiled in Kolkata and coordinated all supply, training and operational efforts for the war. Lt. Gen. J. S. Aurora, commander of Eastern Command, was overseeing the entire operation.
Effectiveness and importance
At the beginning of stage of the Jackpot, the operation was crucial is sustaining the activities of the
Despite limitations and challenges rising from the state of the Indian transport network, availability of supplies, differences of opinion of guerrilla training methods and the decision of the Bangladeshi Government to train the maximum number of guerrillas in the shortest possible time,[16] Which may have caused supply shortages and often arming of only 40% to 50% of the newly trained guerrillas with firearms,[17] The Bangladeshi government in exile managed to field 30,000 regular troops and 100,000 guerrillas and run a campaign that would destroy or damage at least 231 bridges, perform 122 acts of sabotage on railway lines and 90 electric stations,[18] disrupting the logistical/supply system of the Pakistani forces, and kill at least 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3,559 soldiers of the regular army during April to November 1971,[19] and an unspecified number of Police, West Pakistan Rangers, EPCAF and Razakar members, and wound several thousand soldiers. The success and intensity of guerrilla operations after August had also lowered the morale of the Pakistani Army and by November, they chose to remain in their bases whenever possible,[19][20] and the contribution of the guerrilla warfare to the final victory was enormous despite the numerous challenges.[16]
At the conclusion of Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal, the Pakistani Army and Pakistan Navy had driven the Mukti Bahini into India, where they entered a period of reorganization during June and July 1971 to train guerrillas, set up networks and safe houses in the occupied territories to run the insurgency and rebuild the conventional forces. M. A. G Osmani|Col. M. A. G. Osmani divided the country into 11 sectors, while planning to send 2,000–5,000 guerrillas inside Bangladesh every month with 3/4 weeks training to hit all targets of opportunity, while build up the regular force to seize territory in Sylhet,[21][22] Indian officials suggested fielding a force of 8,000 guerrillas with regular troops in leadership position with three or four-month's training.[23] The solution was to activate the hitherto inactive Sector No. 10[24] as a special sector for naval commandos with Col. Osmani in charge from 13 May onwards,[25] and, this Naval Commando force was to be trained as per the Indian suggestion, acting as an elite force for attacking riverine and seabourne targets.
Col. Osmani's initial strategy of sending 2,000–5,000 guerrillas inside
Mukti Bahini riverine activity
Bangladesh is crisscrossed by numerous wide rivers and, during the April–October monsoon flooding, about 300 additional navigable channels.[31] The movement and logistics of the Pakistani Army largely depended on their control of the inland waterways, and of the Sea ports. Mukti Bahini did not operate a separate naval wing during March–June 1971. River craft were requisitioned as needed. The Pakistan Navy and Pakistan Air Force sank one such craft, MV Ostrich, during Operation Barisal on 26 April,[citation needed] while Pakistani gunboats sank 3 boats commanded by Mukti Bahini on 5 May 1971, at Gabura.[32]
The importance of waterways was not lost on Pakistan Eastern Command. After the launch of Operation Searchlight and the successful conclusion of Operation Barisal, General A. O. Mittha (Quarter Master General of Pakistan Army) had recommended the creation of a port operating battalion for Chittagong, in addition to separate River Transport and River Marine Battalion to operate an augmented Cargo and Tanker flotilla.[33] These steps were not implemented, the Army commandeered civilian water crafts for logistics and posted Army and Razakar personnel to guard various ferries, bridges, ports and other naval installations. Pakistan Navy established a Marine Academy in June 1971 to support riverine operations.[34]
The river transport system was vital for economic activity given the primitive state of the road and railways system of
The Bangladesh Naval Commando Operation that was called "Operation Jackpot" was precipitated by events in Toulon, a coastal city of Southern France. The operation was planned to take on Naval Special Service Group of the Pakistan Navy, after it had conducted several other operations. In 1971, there were 11 East Pakistan Naval Submarine Crewmen receiving training there aboard a Pakistani submarine. One commissioned officer (Mosharraf Hassain) and 8 crewmen decided to take control of the submarine and to fight against Pakistan. Their plan was disclosed, however, causing them to flee from death threats made by Pakistan's Naval Intelligence. Out of the 9 crewmen, one made his way to London, the others managed to travel to the Indian Embassy in Geneva, Switzerland. From Geneva, embassy officials took them to New Delhi on 9 April, where they began a program of top secret naval training at C2P.
The operation was planned in the last week of July, under tight security. Information on river tides, weather and East Pakistani naval infrastructure and deployment was collected through the Mukti Bahini. Selected commandos were sent from C2P to forward bases in Tripura and West Bengal, where a final briefing was given to them. Mukti Bahini in Sector No. 1 assisted the group going to Chittagong, Sector No. 2 aided the groups going to Chandpur and Narayanganj and Sector No. 9 assisted the group targeting Mongla. Each commando carried a pair of fins, a knife, a limpet mine, and swimming trunks. Some had compasses, 1 in 3 commandos had Sten guns and hand grenades, the group leaders carried a transistor radio. All the groups carried their own equipment to their targets and after entering Bangladesh between 3 and 9 August, reached their destinations by 12 August, using the local Mukti Bahini network of safehouses. A pair of songs was played in India Radio (Akashbani) at specific times to convey the intended signal for commencing the operations.[38] The first song (Amar putul ajke prothom jabe shoshur bari) was played on 13 August, the second song (Ami tomay joto shuniyechilem gan tar bodole chaini kono dan)[39][40] on 14 August. The result of this operation was:
- Chittagong: Sixty commandos were divided into 3 groups of 20 each, but one group failed to arrive due to Pakistani security on time. Out of 40 commandos, 9 refused to take part,[41] while 31 commandos mined 10 ships instead of 22 initially planned[42] on 16 August[citation needed]. Between 1:45 and 2:15 am, explosions sank the MV Al-Abbas, the MV Hormuz and the Orient barge no. 6, sinking 19,000 tons of arms and ammunition along with damaging/sinking 7 other barges/ships.
- Chandpur: 20 commandos were sent to mine ships at Chandpur.[43] Two commandos ultimately refused to take part, the other 18 divided into 6 groups and mined 4 ships.[44] 3 steamers/barges were damaged or sunk.
- Narayanganj: 20 commandos conducted the sabotage operation. Four ships were sunk or damaged.
- Mongla: 60 commandos went to Mongla port. This team was divided into 5 groups of 12 members each. Ultimately 48 commandos mined 6 ships at Mongla. Twelve commandos had been sent on a separate mission.[45][46]
The simultaneous attacks on Pakistan Naval shipping assets on 16 August destroyed the myth of normalcy in East Pakistan, when the news was flashed in the international media. Pakistan Army investigation concluded that no one had imagined Mukti Bahini capable of conducting such an operation.[47]
Not all Naval commando missions were met with success. Tightened security prevented any operations in Chittagong after the first week of October,[48] while four attempts to damage the Hardinge Bridge failed.[49] Some Commando teams were ambushed and prevented from reaching their objectives.[50] Misfortune and miscalculation caused some missions to fail.[51] Security measures prevented any sabotage attempts on the oil depots at Narayanganj, Bogra, Faridpur and Chittagong, and Mukti Bahini managed to damage the oil depots at Chittagong and Naryanganj using an Alouette Helicopters and a Twin Otter plane on 2 December 1971.
In total, 515 commandos received training at C2P. Eight commandos were killed, 34 wounded and 15 captured during August–December 1971.[52] Naval commandos managed to sink or damage 126 ships/coasters/ferries during that time span, while one source confirms at least 65 vessels of various types (15 Pakistani ships, 11 coasters, 7 gunboats, 11 barges, 2 tankers and 19 river craft by November 1971).[53] had been sunk between August–November 1971. At least 100,000 tons of shipping was sunk or crippled, jetties and wharves were disabled and channels blocked, and the commandos kept East Pakistan in a state of siege without having a single vessel[54] The operational capability of Pakistan Navy was reduced as a result of Operation Jackpot.
- Commando Abdur Raquib, who was killed during the Foolchhori Ghat Operation
- Commando Hossain Farid, who was executed during the second Chittagong operation. He was captured by Pakistani army, who tortured him to death by placing him inside a manhole and bending his body until his vertebral column was shattered.
- Commando Khabiruzzaman, who was killed in second operation in Faridpur
- Commando Sirajul Islam, M. Aziz, Aftab Uddin, and Rafiqul Islam, nothing further is known about them.
- A.W. Chowdhury- Bir Uttom
- Badiul Alam- Bir Uttom
- Shah Alam- Bir Uttom
- Mazhar Ullah- Bir Uttom
- Sheikh Md. Amin Ullah- Bir Uttom
- Abedur Rahman- Bir Uttom
- Mosharraf Hossain- Bir Uttom (His honour was revoked by the ruling Government of Bangladesh)
- Mohammad Khabiruzzan- Bir Bikrom
- Momin Ullah Patwari- Bir Protik
- Shahjahan Kabir- Bir Protik
- Faruq-e-Azam- Bir Protik
- Mohammad Rahmatullah- Bir Protik
- Mohammad Mojjamel Hossain- Bir Protik
- Amir Hossain- Bir Protik
Operation Hot Pants
After the operation of 16 August, all commandos returned to India. After this no pre-planned simultaneous operation was launched by the Naval Commandos. Instead, some groups were sent to destroy specific targets, and other commandos began to hit targets as opportunity presented itself.
Major Jalil, Commander of Mukti Bahini Sector No. 9 had obtained permission from Premier
- Mine the Chalna port entry point
- Attack Pakistani shipping
Escorted by an Indian Navy frigate, on 10 November, these boats successfully mined the entrance of Mongla port. They also chased the British ship "The City of St. Albans" away from Mongla on 11 November 1971.[59]
Indian Army IV corps operation (21 November 1971 – 16 December 1971)
The plan of operation for the Indian Army IV corps (8 Mountain Div., 23 Mountain Div., 57 Mountain Div. and "Kilo Force") may have been codenamed "Operation Jackpot". The opposition forces included the Pakistani 14th Infantry division defending
See also
- Timeline of the Bangladesh Liberation War
- Military plans of the Bangladesh Liberation War
- Mitro Bahini order of battle
- Pakistan Army order of battle, December 1971
- Evolution of Pakistan Eastern Command plan
- 1971 Bangladesh genocide
- Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts
- Operation Barisal
Footnotes
- ^ a b c Islam 2006, p. 211
- ^ "War in the waters: Looking back at Operation Jackpot, 1971". The Daily Star. 6 April 2023.
- ^ a b c d e Jacob 2003, p. 90
- ^ Jacob 2003, p. 190
- ^ a b c d e "Operation Jackpot". Banglapedia. Retrieved 27 July 2015.
- ^ Islam 2006, p. 265
- ^ a b Safiullah 2005, p. 211
- ^ "When an election broke Pakistan in two". India Today. 9 February 2024.
- ^ a b Jacob 2003, pp. 36–37
- ^ Salik 1977, p. 90
- ^ Islam 2006, p. 214
- ^ Jacob 2003, p. 42
- ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 1971, pp. 11–14
- ^ Islam 2006, p. 217
- ^ a b Safiullah 2005, p. 159
- ^ a b Jacob 2003, p. 174
- ^ Islam 2006, p. 288
- ^ Salik 1977, p. 104
- ^ a b Salik 1977, p. 118
- ^ Salik 1977, p. 101
- ^ Jacob 2003, pp. 43–44
- ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, pp. 53–55
- ^ Jacob 2003, p. 93
- ^ Safiullah 2005, pp. 162–163
- ^ a b Rahman 2006, p. 47
- ^ Islam 2006, p. 297
- ^ Islam 2006, pp. 274, 292, 297
- ^ Khan 1992, p. 96
- ^ Niazi 1998, p. 96
- ^ Islam 2006, p. 292
- ^ Khan 1992, pp. 111–112
- ISBN 984-437-086-8
- ^ Niazi 1998, p. 84
- ^ Pns Qasim Archived 4 July 2006 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Salik 1977, p. 130
- ^ a b Rahman 2006, p. 66
- ^ Islam 2006, pp. 265–68
- ^ Islam 2006, pp. 263–65
- ^ Muktijudhdher Rachana Shomogra, Mahmud, Sezan, p. 61.
- ISBN 978-81-953129-3-1.
- ^ Rahman 2006, p. 79
- ^ Shafique Ullah, Col. Md, Muktijuddhay Nou-Commando, p. 27
- ^ Rahman 2006, p. 165
- ^ Rahman 2006, p. 168
- ^ Rahman 2006, p. 114
- ^ Roy 1995, p. 298
- ISBN 984-437-086-8
- ^ Rahman 2006, p. 94
- ^ Rahman 2006, pp. 220–223
- ^ Rahman 2006, pp. 122, 196–198, 217
- ^ Rahman 2006, pp. 84, 119, 201
- ^ Rahman 2006, pp. 268–270
- ^ Jacob 2003, p. 91
- ^ Roy 1995, pp. 141, 174
- ^ Operation Jackpot, Mahmud, Sezan, mukhobondho
- ^ Mukul 2005, p. 36
- ^ a b Islam 2006, p. 298
- ^ Rahman 2006, p. 227
- ^ Islam 2006, p. 303
Sources
- Islam, Rafiqul (2006) [First publisehd 1981]. A Tale of Millions. Ananna Publishers. ISBN 984-412-033-0.
- ISBN 984-05-1395-8.
- OCLC 28547552.
- Mukul, M. R. Akther (2005). Ami Bijoy Dekhechi (in Bengali). Sagar Publisher's. OCLC 416393761.
- Niazi, A. A. K. (1998). The Betrayal of East Pakistan. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-577727-1.
- Rahman, Khalilur (2006). Muktijuddhay Nou-Abhijan (in Bengali). Sāhitya Prakāśa. ISBN 984-465-449-1.
- Roy, Mihir K. (1995). War in the Indian Ocean. Lancer Publishers. ISBN 978-1-897829-11-0.
- ISBN 984-91449-4-7.
- ISBN 81-7062-108-9.
Further reading
- Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An army, Its Role and Rule: A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil, 1947–1999. RoseDog Books. ISBN 9780805995947
- Hassan Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul (1978). Memories of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan. Oxford University Press. ISBN 984-05-0156-9